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INTRODUCTION 
One problem zn thinking through the lawyer's 
responsibilities in triangular relationships is that the 
relationship may not be continuously triangular. . . . 
Conceptualizing both the 'relevant others' as clients, and 
the lawyer as engaged in multiple representation, seems 
entirely natural when the triangular relationship is in its 
normal state. The question is whether there are reasons for 
refusing to conceptualize it in this way. 
-Geoffrey Hazari 
[Vol. 4: I 
The conflicts of interest that can arise when liability insurance 
companies control the defense and settlement of claims filed against their 
insureds have long concerned members of the tort defense bar,2 as well as 
specialists in the fields of insurance3 and professional responsibility.4 I 
approach these conflicts from an insurance perspective, and I begin with 
the following observation: Whatever else can be said about the 
relationship between a defense lawyer, an insurance company and an 
insured, that relationship exists only because the company issued the 
insured a liability insurance policy. Most liability insurance policies 
assign the company the "duty" and "right" to defend the insured whenever 
the insured requests a defense against a defined set of c laims. Ordinarily, 
the company fulfills that duty and exercises that right by retaining a lawyer 
to defend the insured. In that situation, the scope of the lawyer' s  
representation o f  the insured will include all that i s  encompassed within 
the company's duty to defend. 
This article explores the scope of the defense lawyer's  representation 
of the insured by thinking about the lawyer as the means for fulfilling the 
company's  duty to. defend. A basic-and I think new-insight is that the 
conflicts of interest that draw our attention to the insurance defense lawyer 
arise out of an incomplete transfer from insured to company of what I will 
call "claim risk." I focus on the incomplete transfer of claim risk because 
1. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An  Exploratory Analysis, 
I GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 1 5 , 3 5-38  ( 1 987). 
2 .  See, ·e.g., Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle: Standards of Ethical 
Representation By the insurance Defense Lawyer, FOR THE D EF. ,  Feb. 1989, at 7. 
3. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Se!llement, 
67 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 36 ( 1 954). 
4. See, e.g. , CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 3 8, 42 ( 1 986). 
I 
I 
l 
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it tests the company' s  duty to defend. When the company bears all the 
important claim risk, we hardly need to think about the company' s  duty to 
defend, because the company has every incentive to attend to the defense. 
In that situation, the interesting issues concern the company' s  right to 
defend and what the insured must do to cooperate in that defense . It is 
only when the company' s  incentive begins to wane that the duty to defend 
becomes interesting. 
A second basic insight concerns the importance of looking beyond the 
familiar triangle of the lawyer, the insured and the company when 
analyzing liability insurance conflicts . The triangle is a useful metaphor, 
but it leaves out a crucial participant: the plaintiff who brings the liability 
claim. A relationship between a defense lawyer, an insurance company 
and an insured exists only in relation to-that is,  in a relationship with--a 
plaintiff. For that reason, we cannot understand the dynamics of the 
professional responsibility triangle without also considering the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, when thinking about insurance defense lawyers I prefer 
to picture the liability insurance relationship, not as a simple triangle, but 
rather as the set of triangles that exists between four points-a tetrahedron. 
When looking at any particular face of a tetrahedron, it can appear to be a 
simple triangle, just as when looking at any one aspect of the liability 
insurance relationship, it can appear to involve only three parties .  But, 
there is always the "hidden" fourth party, whose relationship with these 
three parties will affect their relationships with each other. 
Figure 1 on the following the following page depicts one view of the 
liability insurance tetrahedron. As figure 1 reflects, the professional 
responsibility triangle is not the only interesting face of the tetrahedron . 
There is also the jury triangle, composed of the three parties that a jury 
deciding the liability claim would see: the lawyer, the insured, and the 
plaintiff. There is the settlement triangle, composed of the three parties 
who, ordinarily, negotiate toward settlement of the claim: the lawyer, the 
company, and the plaintiff.5 And there is a final, very interesting triangle 
composed of the plaintiff, the insured and the company that I will have a 
great deal to say about. Each of these faces of the liability insurance 
tetrahedron can seem to form a three way relationship. As with the 
5. See Charles Silver & Kent D.  Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of 
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 293-96 ( 1 996) (on "ordinary" case). 
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professional responsibility triangle, our understanding of these 
relationships can be deepened by considering the fourth party. 6 
Settlement 
Triangle 
Company 
li\ I \ 
/; \ Professional _ - Responsibility !... ... ... --\;-\ 
\ I \ 
I Lawyer \ 
Triangle 
� � 
I \ 
I \ 
Plaintiff w----------r---------• Insured 
Defendant 
Jury Triangle 
FIGURE 1 
Part I of this article introduces this tetrahedron framework. Part II then 
explores the framework in the context of three sets of hypothetical cases 
involving the incomplete transfer of claim risk: one set in which the risk is 
shared because of dollar limits on the insurance coverage; a second set in 
which the risk is shared because of uncertainty about insurance coverage 
for the case; and a third set in which the risk is shared because the plaintiff 
has the potential to cause the insured a kind of harm that is not covered by 
6.  In al l of this I readily acknowledge that I have collapsed the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff s  lawyer into a single unit, even though these two parties do not always have 
identical interests. I t  i s  my working hypothesis that, at least as respects the professional 
responsibil ities of insurance defense lawyers, nothing of analytical importance is l ost as a 
result. 
\ 
l I 
l 
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the insurance policy. My goal is to use the tetrahedron framework to 
explore the conflicts in these cases and also to use these cases to explore 
whether that framework is a useful analytical tool. 
Part III then addresses the role of the defense lawyer in fulfilling the 
company' s  duty to defend in shared claim risk situations. I begin with the 
conclusions reached by Professor Charles Silver and Dean Kent Syverud in 
their recent analysis of the professional responsibilities of insurance 
defense lawyers in full coverage cases7 and then extend those conclusions 
to encompass the shared claim risk situations presented in my hypothetical 
cases .  For reasons that will  be explained, I agree on insurance law grounds 
with their conclusion that the insurance company is  entitled to limit the 
scope of the defense lawyer' s  representation of the insured to minimizing 
what I will call the "judgment risk"8 at issue in the claim. 
Where I disagree with Silver and Syverud is  with respect to the 
company's responsibility for what I will call the "non-judgment risk" faced 
by the insured. I locate this responsibility in the company' s  good faith 
obligation to give equal consideration to the interests of the insured, and I 
conclude that this  obligation requires the company to retain the defense 
lawyer to give primary consideration to the interests of the insured in 
conflict situations when "equal consideration" is an impossibility. Thus, I 
ground what is sometimes called the primary client rule,9 not in 
professional responsibility law, but rather in insurance law. 
7. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5. 
8 .  See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5 ,  at 296-3 0 1 .  Si lver and Syverud do not use the 
claim risk framework, but I think they would agree with this characterization. "Judgment 
risk" is the risk of having to pay all or part of a judgment entered in a c laim. "Non­
judgment risk" is every other kind of claim risk; it inc ludes the risk that the claim is not 
covered (which I will cal l "coverage risk"), the risk that the company wil l  not settle the 
claim (which I wil l  call "settlement risk"), and the risk of consequences other than 
judgments, such as reputational harm (which I wi l l  call "other non-judgment risk"). Non­
judgment risk also includes defense costs, but because the company is conducting the 
defense in the cases explored in this paper, defense costs are not part of the insured's non­
judgment risk in these cases. 
9. See S ilver & Syverud, supra note 5 ,  at 335 (criticizing the primary client rule and 
proposing an alternative, non-subordination rule). 
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I. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANAL YZfNG INSURANCE DEFENS E  CONFLICTS: 
SHARED CLAIM RISK AND THE LIABILITY INSURANCE TETRAHEDRON 
Under the prevailing norms of insurance practice, the company' s  
obligations t o  the insured are analyzed within the framework of contract 
law, as that law has been developed in the context of standard form 
insurance policies . 1 0  Within that framework, the point of departure is the 
insurance policy. Whatever else the company' s  obligations may be, those 
obligations include what was promised in the form contract the company 
chose to use.  
With respect to the company' s  obligation to defend, most l iability 
insurance policies provide little more than the fol lowing: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" to which this insurance applies .  We 
will have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking 
those damages. We may at our discretion investigate any 
"occurrence" and settle any claim or "suit" that may 
result. 1 1  
In  addition, these standard form policies contain provisions requiring 
the insured to cooperate with the company and prohibiting the insured 
from settling an insured claim without the company's  consent.12 These 
provisions constitute the whole of the language in the typical insurance 
policy directly relating to defense obligations.13 
1 0. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Claims Stories, Sales 
Stories and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1 395 ( 1 994). 
1 1 . ISO CGL 1 986. The wording in the standard automobile and homeowners' 
insurance policies is essentially the same. 
1 2 . "You and any other involved insured must . . . [ c ]ooperate with us in the 
investigation, settlement or defense of the claim or "suit" . . .  No insureds wi l l, except at 
thei r  own cost, voluntari ly make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense, 
other than for first aid, without our consent." !d. 
1 3 . The remainder of the policy principally addresses l imits on the company's duty to 
indemnify and claiming conditions. Because the "duty to defend" appl ies only to suits 
seeking damages for which the company would be obligated to indemnify �he insured, these 
other provisions do relate indirectly to the duty to defend. 
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Taken together, these standard form provisions mean that (in the 
ordinary case) the insurance company selects the lawyer who will 
represent the insured, directs that lawyer' s  handling of the case, and 
controls the investigation, negotiation and settlement of the case.14 Indeed, 
an insured who interferes with the insurance company's  right to defend or 
discretion to settle risks losing insurance for that case. 15  These provisions 
also mean, however, that the company has both a "duty to defend" and-­
although this is not explicitly stated in the policy-a "duty to settle." 1 6  
Thus, the insurance contract clearly contemplates the defense and 
settlement of the insurance claim as the prerogative of the company, but it 
also grants the insured a right to a defense and, in the appropriate 
circumstance, to a settlement of the claim. If these latter rights are to have 
any meaning, they must-and do--set some limits on the insurance 
company' s  right to defend and settle .  
A. Shared Claim Risk 
In every case, the interests of the company and the insured diverge to 
the following degree: absent reputational or some unusual concern of the 
insured, she would prefer a company-funded settlement over further 
litigation, no matter how unreasonable the plaintiff s demand; and, if there 
is no settlement, the insured would prefer the company to spend more on 
defense. This is an example of what economists call ex post moral hazard: 
because the insurance company is paying for the settlement and defense, 
the insured' s  incentives regarding the consequences of an allegedly 
harmful event differ from what they would be if there were no insurance. 1 7  
The insurance contract provisions granting the company control over 
defense and settlement address that incentive problem. A rational 
prospective insured would prefer a liability insurance contract giving the 
14 .  See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 265.  This typical practice was also 
confirmed to me in a series of interviews of South Florida personal injury lawyers. For a 
description of these interviews, see Tom Baker, Transforming P unishment Into 
Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1 998  WIS. L. REv. (forthcoming 
Spring 1 998) .  
1 5 . See, e.g., Steen v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 442, N.W.2d 1 58 (Minn. Ct .  App. 
1 989). 
1 6. See generally Kent D.  Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1 1 1 3 ( 1 990) 
(explaining the company's  duty to make reasonable efforts to settle a case within the policy 
l imits in  order to protect the insured from a judgment in  excess of the policy l imit). 
1 7. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 
237, 269-70 ( 1 996) (describing ex ante and ex post moral hazard). 
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company some such control, just as a rational prospective insured would 
prefer a health insurance policy with a deductible or copayment provision 
and some degree of oversight of the medical treatment.18 Otherwise, the 
insured would demand at the point of claim a level of defense that she 
would not be willing to pay for at the time of purchasing the policy.19 
Indeed, from an insured' s  perspective, a l iability insurance policy that 
shifts the control over the defense and settlement of the c laim to the 
company is much less threatening than a health insurance policy that shifts 
control over health treatment. In the ordinary l iability case, the 
defendant' s  primary (and often exclusive) concern is  avoiding or 
minimizing the cost of an adverse judgment. That concern easily can be 
transferred to an insurance company by a contract that makes the company 
l iable for paying the judgment. In contrast, the "health" that is the primary 
concern of someone who buys health insurance cannot so easily be 
transferred by contract. 
As this suggests, insurance company control presents difficult 
problems when the insurance contract does not transfer to the company all 
the important risk affected by that control .  That is  necessarily the case in 
health insurance; no contract can ever transfer all the important risk 
affected by control over health treatment. That is not necessarily the case 
in l iability insurance; liability insurance can come much closer to 
transferring all the important risk affected by the company' s  control over 
the claim. Yes, there are deductibles, and there can be difficulties 
associated with being a defendant that are not eliminated by l iability 
insurance .  But, those deductibles and difficulties usually are relatively 
insignificant, as least as compared to the risk of paying a judgment.20 
I call the risk that can be affected by the company's  control over the 
claim the "claim risk." Claim risk is the risk associated with a claim once 
an event that may give rise to the c laim has occurred. It includes all the 
possible consequences of a claim, such as defense costs, payment to the 
plaintiff, and loss of good will or reputational harm. 
1 8 . For an analysis of the insurance/control nexus, see Tom Baker, Torts, Insurance 
and Social Control in the Age of Managed Care (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
1 9 . See Baker, supra note 1 7, at 268.  
20. Where the deductible is very high, as is increasingly the case in  the maj or corporate 
l iabi lity context, the insurance agreements do not transfer control over defense and 
settlement to the company. This paper does not address that context. It is concerned solely 
with traditional l iabi l ity insurance policies that transfer control to the company. 
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An insurance contract does not (and cannot) transfer all the important 
risk of an injury-causing activity, but it can (and sometimes even does) 
transfer all the important claim risk. For example, in the automobile 
context the risk of driving includes the risk of harm to the insured driver. 
That is a risk that not even the most generous insurance policy can transfer 
completely to an insurance company, because money simply cannot fully 
compensate an insured for injury to his or her body. But, by agreeing to 
cover all the costs of defense and to pay any liability claims, an automobile 
liability insurance policy can transfer essentially all the important claim 
risk associated with driving.2 1  
Of course, the fact that the liability insurance company can bear 
essentially all the important claim risk does not mean that it always does 
so. The insured can retain significant claim risk for at least three reasons: 
dollar limits on the amount of coverage provided by the insurance policy, 
uncertainty over insurance coverage for the claim, and the potential for the 
plaintiff to cause the insured a significant kind of harm that is not covered 
by the insurance policy, such as reputational harm or, in some states, 
punitive damages.22 In these shared claim risk situations, the company' s  
control over defense and settlement can provide the opportunity t o  shift 
claim risk to the insured .  Thus, unlike the paradigm liability insurance 
defense situation-where the ex post moral hazard we worry about is that 
of the insured-shared claim risk cases present a dual moral hazard 
23 . problem. 
B. The Liability Insurance Tetrahedron 
In teaching and thinking about insurance, I find it helpful to use 
geometric figures.  The triangle below represents the liability insurance 
relationship when the company faces all the important claim risk in the 
case, which is understood to be the usual case.24 In this situation, we can 
think of the interests of the company and the insured as having merged. 
2 1 .  The possible exception is the risk of future premium increases under an experience­
rated insurance policy. 
22. See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1 998  Wrs. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Spring 1 998) .  
23 .  See Baker, supra note 1 7, at  274 n . l 8 1  (collecting dual moral hazard l iterature). 
24. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 263 . 
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Plaintiff 
Company Lawyer 
(Insured..u---------� 
FIGURE2 
In this relationship, we usually think of the company and the insurance 
defense lawyer allied against the plaintiff; thus, some readers may resist 
thinking of this relationship as triangular. Yet, as any insurance defense 
lawyer or insurance adjuster can attest, the relationship between the 
company and the lawyer can involve conflict even in a case in which the 
company bears all the claim risk.25 
The conflict principally revolves around defense fees.  The company 
has an interest in reducing defense costs that is not shared by the lawyer. 
The plaintiff can use that interest to obtain a settlement that reflects, not 
only the risk of an adverse judgment, but also the costs of defense . Thus, 
this relationship presents an opportunity for the company and plaintiff to 
benefit at the "expense" of the lawyer. 
There is also a potential community of interest between the plaintiff 
and the defense lawyer. Both plaintiff and lawyer have an interest in the 
continued existence of a claim: the lawyer to bill the file,26 and the 
plaintiff to keep alive the possibility of payment. In the normal situation, 
we expect this potential community of interest to be overwhelmed by the 
lawyer's  interest in proving her or his worth to the company by dispatching 
25 .  See, e.g., Anonymous, What Many of Us Really Think but are Afraid to Say, FOR 
THE D EF . ,  July 1 993, at 2 ("From an economic standpoint, your law firm's interests are not 
necessarily the same as the insurance carriers. Where a case can be settled to eliminate your 
bi l l ,  they are going to do it."); Donald W. Rees & Robert F. Hall, Communicating with the 
Insurer Consumer, FOR THE DEF . ,  Sept. 1 994, at 4. 
26. This interest assumes an hourly fee arrangement. Paying lawyers on a capitation or 
flat fee basis changes the incentives present in the relationship. Thi s  paper focuses 
exclusively on the incentive associated with hourly fees and does not address different fee 
arrangements or the incentives associated with those arrangements. 
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the claim. Nevertheless, this potential alliance appears to have resulted in 
27 fraud on the company. 
When the insured and the company share claim risk, the picture is 
more complicated. Instead of three relevant parties with potentially 
conflicting interests, there are four: the company, the insured, the defense 
lawyer and the plaintiff. The figure below shows the triangle from above 
"opened up" to reflect the conflict between the company and insured that 
results from the shared claim risk. 
27.  See Peter Carbonara, Fleecing insurance Companies, California-Style, AM. LAW. ,  
Apr. 1 990, at  52  (describing al leged fraud by a group of lawyers known as "the All iance"); 
Alfred G. Haggerty, Fireman's Fund, Allstate Settle with Three RICO Suit Lawyers, NAT'L 
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 5, 1 990, at 4 (reporting settlement by three al leged members of the 
al l iance). This example involves independent counsel selected by the insured pursuant to 
Cali fornia's Cumis statute. CAL. Clv. CODE § 2860 (West 1 993). The conflict between 
lawyer and company is less acute when the company chooses the defense lawyer, but it does 
not go away. See Anonymous, supra note 25, and Rees & Hal l ,  supra note 25 .  
1 1 2 
Insured 
Defendant 
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If we plot the relationships between these four in three dimensions, the 
geometric figure that results is a tetrahedron--which I think of as a three 
dimensional triangle (and which I visualize by thinking of a pyramid with a 
triangular base).28 Appendix A shows the liability insurance tetrahedron in 
28 .  The fol lowing picture is a three-dimensional representation o f  the l iabil ity 
insurance tetrahedron : 
P laintiff 
I nsuced 6 L'wye< 
Defendant Company 
<. 
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a form that can be copied, enlarged, and then cut out and assembled into a 
three dimensional tetrahedron for individual use. 
Each of the four faces of the tetrahedron represents a facet of the 
liability insurance relationship. The "professional responsibility triangle" 
represents the relationship between the company, the lawyer, and the 
insured. The "jury triangle" represents the relationship between the three 
parties that a jury deciding a liability claim would see : the insured, the 
plaintiff and the defense lawyer. The "settlement triangle" represents the 
relationship between the three parties that, ordinarily, are directly involved 
in the settlement of the case: the company, the plaintiff, and the defense 
lawyer.29 And the "plaintiffs choice triangle" represents the relationship 
between the company, the plaintiff and the insured. Each of these 
components of this relationship is characterized by the kinds of tensions 
that I began to explore in discussing the company-lawyer-plaintiff triangle 
above. 
II. EXPLORING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE TETRAHEDRON THROUGH 
PATTERN CONFLICT CASES 
The liability insurance paradigm-in which the company controls the 
defense and settlement of claims using a single lawyer who represents both 
the company and the insured--is based on the assumption that in most 
cases the interests of the company and the insured do not fundamentally 
conflict.  In other words, the l iability insurance paradigm is based on an 
assumption that the company bears all the important claim risk. Liability 
insurance contracts are theoretically capable of transferring all the 
important claim risk from the insured to the insurance company. The 
degree to which existing liability insurance contracts approach this goal is  
an empirical question to which we do not have a rigorous answer. I t  i s  
clear, however, that liability insurance contracts do not always transfer all 
the important claim risk faced by insureds. While we cannot say what 
percentage of actually filed insurance claims involve shared claim risk, we 
can identify with some confidence the patterns of these cases according to 
the reasons underlying the sharing of claim risk. 
29. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 295 (stating that the defense lawyer wil l  
usual ly be retained to represent the company at settlement); see also, Keeton, supra note 3, 
at 1 1 68-7 1 (arguing that defense counsel may represent the company and not the insured for 
settlement purposes). 
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There are at least three such reasons: ( 1) the dollar limits of the 
insurance policy are less than the potential damages at issue in the claim; 
(2) substantive limits on the coverage provided by the insurance policy 
make the company's obligation to pay all or part of the claim doubtful or 
uncertain; and (3) the plaintiff has the potential to cause the defendant a 
kind of harm that is not covered by the insurance policy. The analysis that 
follows explores three sets of hypothetical cases that illustrate these 
patterns, using the framework developed in Part I. 
A. Shared Claim Risk Resulting from Dollar Limits 
In the first set of pattern cases, the insured and the company share the 
claim risk because of dollar limits on the coverage provided by the liability 
insurance policy. 
1 .  The Low Limits Case 
An individual insured with a $100,000 limit liability 
insurance policy cut off a stranger's foot with a lawn 
mower. The stranger filed suit seeking $1 million and then 
offered to settle the case for $100,000. 
In the Low Limits Case, the insured bears significant claim risk 
because the potential damages exceed the limits of the insurance policy. 
This case presents a well known conflict of interest: in the absence of 
some insurance law intervention, the company has only its subsequent 
defense costs to lose when it turns down a policy-limits settlement offer. 
Courts have described this situation as presenting the company with the 
opportunity to "gamble with the insured's money."30 
Courts have attempted to resolve this conflict by requiring the 
insurance company to act "as if' there were no insurance limits when 
evaluating a settlement proposal.31 This duty means that the company has 
a duty to accept a reasonable settlement offer within the policy limits, and 
30. See, e.g. , Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. ,  23 F .3d I 1 75 ,  I 1 79 
(7th Cir. 1 994 ) ; see also Murphy v. Al lstate Ins. Co.,  1 32 Cal .  Rptr. 424, 426 ( 1 976) ("the 
duty to settle is implied in law to protect the insured from exposure to l iability i n  excess of 
coverage as a resu l t  of the insurer's gamble--on which only the insured might lose") .  
3 1 . See Syverud, supra note 16 ,  at  1 1 22-26 (describing competing standards for 
evaluating whether company should be held l iable for fai lure to settle a c laim). The 
company may also have the duty to offer the policy l imits to settle the appropriate case. See 
Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532,  53  7 ( 1 Oth Cir. 1 976) ("the duty to settle does not hinge 
on the existence of a settlement offer from the plaintiff') .  
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i f  the company breaches that duty, it will be l iable for the full amount of 
any subsequent judgment in the case against the insured. 32 This duty to 
settle increases the company's incentive to settle a case and, thus, reduces 
the risk of an uninsured excess judgment. It does not, however, eliminate 
that risk. There remains the possibility that the company will not settle a 
case within policy limits and that a jury will conclude that the company 
made every reasonable effort to do so. 
Thus, notwithstanding the insurance law "solution" to the conflict of 
interest, the company and the insured stil l  share the claim risk in a low 
l imits case. Moreover, when the value of the case exceeds the policy 
limits, the company lacks the usual incentive to defend the case at a level 
that is  proportional to the damages at stake. Indeed, once it  becomes 
reasonably clear that the company will have to pay the full l imits of the 
policy in the case, the company's  indemnity obligation provides little 
financial incentive to defend the case. 
These residual conflicts between the company and the insured have 
consequences within each facet of the l iability insurance tetrahedron. In 
the context of the plaintiff's choice triangle (company-plaintiff-insured), 
the conflict has the potential to weaken the usual alliance between the 
company and insured and to create an alliance between plaintiff and 
insured in favor of a settlement. The insured wants the case to settle to 
avoid the risk of an uncovered judgement; the plaintiff would like a quick 
resolution of the case, preferably at a premium. 33 
In the context of the professional responsibility triangle (company­
insured-lawyer), the conflict gives the company an incentive to manage the 
defense in a way that shifts more of the claim risk to the insured. This can 
happen in at least two ways. First, the company can use its control over 
the l iability case to strengthen its position in any subsequent fai lure to 
settle case. For example, the company could direct the defense lawyer not 
to arrive at an opinion regarding the value of the case or not to create any 
documents stating possible verdicts in the case, or the company could 
instruct the defense lawyer to minimize the value of the case in documents 
32. See Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 20-2 1 .  
33 .  In light of the rule that the company will be liable for excess verdicts when it has 
the opportunity to obtain a reasonable settlement within the limits, the conflict between the 
company and the insured is most acute in situations in which a within-limits settlement 
demand is not clearly reasonable. A rational plaintiff would use that conflict as a pressure 
point to obtain a settlement at the high end of what is reasonable. 
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about the case.34 Such directions would make it more difficult for the 
insured to prevail in a subsequent failure to settle case . By inhibiting the 
defense lawyer' s  ability to communicate her perspective on the case to the 
relevant decision makers in the company, such directions may also reduce 
the probability that the company settles the case. 
S econd, the company can shift risk to the insured by shirking in the 
defense of the case . This seems most likely to occur in a case in which the 
value of the case c learly exceeds the limits of the policy and there is no 
opportunity to settle within limits.  But, even when there is an opportunity 
to settle (as in the Low Limits case), a company that turns down that 
opportunity is only contingently liable for all the damages at stake and thus 
has less incentive to defend the case at the level proportional to those 
damages than would a solvent, uninsured defendant. 
The lawyer' s  interests in this conflict may at first appear contradictory. 
On the one hand, the lawyer' s  interests clearly lie with the insured in favor 
of a strong defense and against company shirking. On the other hand,  the 
lawyer' s  interests lie with the company in favor of litigation and against 
settlement. Of course, it is quite possible for the lawyer to satisfy both 
these interests: opposing settlement and insisting on a thorough defense of 
the liability claim.35 
The conflict between the company and insured also has a potential 
spillover effect in the jury triangle (insured-lawyer-plaintiff), where it has 
the potential to create an alliance between the insured and the plaintiff 
against the lawyer. Both the insured and the plaintiff want the case to 
settle . The more the lawyer is seen as resisting settlement and siding 
"with" the company "against" the insured, the stronger the plaintiff-insured 
alliance .  For this reason, plaintiffs ' lawyers sometimes prepare demand 
letters aimed as much at the insured as the lawyer or company.36 One goal 
of such letters is to induce the insured to retain personal counsel who may, 
34. In an interview conducted under a condition of anonymity for another project, a 
defense lawyer reported that he was instructed by an insurance company not to make a I written assessment of likely damages or settlement numbers in cases he handles for them, in 
order to make it more difficult for insureds to prevail in fai lure to settle cases. Interview t 
with lnsumnce Defense Lawyoc (name confidential), in Miami, Fla. (May 1 7, 1 996). Fm a 
'·  description of the interviews, see generally Baker, supra note 1 4. i 3 5 .  This i s  an example of a situation where an alternative fee arrangement could create f 
a different incentive. Were the law firm paid a flat fee to handle a given percentage of the � 
company' s  litigated cases, the firm would not have a fee-based incentive to oppose a t.· settlement in a particular case. f 
36 .  See Baker, supra note 1 4. J 
f 
f 1 
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in effect, work with the plaintiff to pressure the lawyer and the company to 
settle the claim. 37 If the company does not settle the case and a large 
judgment results, the insured and the plaintiff may then ally against the 
lawyer in a much more concrete fashion: the insured settles with the 
plaintiff, assigns to the plaintiff the insured' s  rights against the lawyer and 
the company, and then assists the plaintiff in a failure to settle suit against 
the company. Lurking in the background is a potential malpractice claim 
against the lawyer. 
Considering the jury and professional responsibility triangles 
simultaneously, we can see how tensions in one facet of the liability 
insurance relationship can affect another. An important concern with 
respect to the professional responsibility triangle is that the lawyer' s  long­
term economic dependence on the company gives the lawyer an incentive 
to favor the company against the insured. This concern plays out in the 
jury triangle as the wedge the plaintiff uses to attempt to split the lawyer 
and the insured. At the same time, however, the ability of the plaintiff and 
the insured to ally against the lawyer in the jury triangle may play out in 
the professional responsibility triangle by giving the lawyer an incentive 
not to favor the company over the insured. In the event of a large, 
uncovered excess verdict, the lawyer is a potential deep pocket target .  
This personal risk may lead the lawyer to bond more tightly with the 
insured, and, by extension, even the plaintiff .  
The conflict between company and insured also has contradictory 
potential in the settlement triangle (plaintiff, lawyer, company), assuming, 
of course, that the lawyer handles the settlement on behalf of the company. 
Provided that the settlement offer is not clearly reasonable, it is in the 
interest of both the lawyer and the company to resist settlement: the 
company to avoid paying more than it is legally obligated to pay, and the 
lawyer to continue receiving fees for the defense of the case. Two factors 
mitigate against this alliance between lawyer and company, however. The 
personal risk of the lawyer described above may lead the lawyer to favor 
settlement when the company would not. Moreover, to the extent that the 
resolution of the conflict in the professional responsibility triangle results 
in a more expensive defense, the company's  incentive to settle will closer 
approach that of the plaintiffs, thus increasing the community of interest 
37 .  !d. 
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between company and plaintiff "against" the lawyer in favor of avoiding 
defense costs. 38 
2. The Multiple Victim Case 
An insured with an automobile liability insurance policy 
with a $300,000 per accident limit caused a multiple car 
accident. Three family members seriously injured in one 
of the cars filed suit before any of the other victims. The 
three immediately offer to settle for $3 00,000. 
This case is a variation on a low limits case. I use this case to correct 
any misimpression that it is always the insured who pushes to settle a low 
limits case. It would be in the company' s  interest to exhaust the policy 
limits by settling and thereby save the costs of continuing to defend the 
insured. The insured would like to keep the company-paid defense until all 
the cases arising out of the accident are resolved. 
In both this case and the Low Limits Case just considered, the conflict 
between the company and the insured arises from the lack of adequate 
insurance. In the Multiple Victim Case, however, the company is the one 
motivated to settle, not the insured. This difference has consequences 
within each aspect of the liability insurance relationship. 
Consider first the plaintiff' s choice triangle.  As in the Low Limits 
Case, the conflict between the insured and the company threatens the usual 
bond between the company and the insured. This time, however, the 
potential alliance is between these first three plaintiffs and the company. 
Now the reason for calling this the "plaintiff' s choice" triangle becomes 
clear. A conflict between the company and the insured provides a plaintiff 
with a potential ally where, before, there were two opponents. In the Low 
Limits Case the potential ally was the insured. Here, the potential ally is 
the company. 
Whether the plaintiff chooses an alliance in any particular case and, if 
so, with whom, depends on the situation. Consider first the Low Limits 
Case. If the insured has significant, collectible assets, a rational plaintiff 
would have l ittle interest in an alliance with the insured against the 
company to promote a within-limits settlement-unless either the 
38 .  This will be espec ially true when the insured has l i ttle or no personal assets, 
because the lack of assets does not relieve the company of the duty to settle, but i t  
dramatically reduces the plaintiffs interest i n  an excess judgment. See Steele v .  Hartford 
Fire Ins .  Co., 788 F.2d 44 1 ,  446-48 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J .). 
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plaintiff ' s  case on liability is weak or the damages are unlikely to exceed 
the policy limits.39 If the insured does not have significant collectible 
assets, however, a rational plaintiff would have great interest in an alliance 
with the insured in favor of settlement,40 regardless of the strength of the 
case or the size of the damages in relation to the policy limits .  
The Multiple Victim Case presents the plaintiff with a similar choice .  
If the insured has significant, collectible assets, a rational plaintiff would 
have no interest in an alliance with the company to promote a quick 
settlement-unless, once again, either the plaintiff s case on liability is 
weak or the damages are unlikely to exceed the policy limits .  But, if  the 
insured does not have significant, collectible assets, a rational plaintiff 
would have great interest in an alliance in favor of settlement (this time, of 
course, with the company), regardless of the strength of the case or the size 
of the damages in relation to the policy limits .  
Courts'  treatment of settlements i n  multiple victim cases reflects the 
dynamics of this "plaintiff s  choice." The black letter standard remains 
what Keeton called the "more rustic rule, ' first come, first served ' "4 1-
meaning that the company may settle individual claims in a manner that 
leaves less insurance money for later claimants.42 Nevertheless, that rule 
has been qualified over time to protect both the insured and other claimants 
from opportunistic plaintiffs and companies . When the insured has assets, 
it is the insured who needs protection from a colluding plaintiff and 
company; the duty of good faith provides that insured some protection.43 
When the insured does not have assets, it is the other victims who need 
protection; the mandatory allocation of the available insurance to all 
victims required in some jurisdictions provides those victims some 
39 .  In either of those two cases, the plaintiff may bel ieve that an a l l iance with the 
insured against the company would make it possible to obta in a more generous settlement 
than would be possible if there were no insurance. 
40. The a l l i ance would seem to be the strongest in cases in which the insured defendant 
has some assets (and thus some interest in avoiding an excess verdict), but not enough to 
justify great effort on the part of the plaintiff. 
4 1 .  See Robert E. Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability Insurance Claims, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 27, 38 ( 1 956). 
42. See, e.g., Al lstate Ins. Co.  v.  Evans, 409 S . E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1 99 1  ) .  
43.  \)'hi le the contours of "bad faith" in this context are far from settled, a dec is ion in 
Massachusetts suggestd that sett l ing quickly with one c laimant and leaving the insured to 
defend remaining cases on i ts own would constitute bad faith. See Voccio v. Rel iance Ins .  
Co. ,  703 F.2d I ,  3 -4 ( 1 st Cir .  1 983)  (dicta that insurance company could be l iable if a 
settlement with one plaintiff caused an excess verdict by another). 
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protection.44 As in the Low Limits case, then, insurance law resists the 
detrimental consequences of opportunistic behavior by the company. 
Nevertheless, insurance law does not (and cannot) eliminate the conflict 
between the companies and insureds that results from there being too l ittle 
msurance. 
Consider next the professional responsibility triangle (company­
lawyer-insured) . The conflict in the Multiple Victim Case has at l east the 
potential to strengthen the bond between the insured and the lawyer. Both 
the lawyer and the insured have an interest in the company continuing to 
pay to defend the case, an interest which conflicts with the company' s  
interest in terminating its involvement i n  the claim. This  common interest 
may not overcome the lawyer' s  economic dependence on the company, but 
it provides an incentive to manage that dependent relationship in a way 
that keeps this case alive (for example, by bringing to the company' s  
attention the case law indicating that there i s  some risk t o  a company that 
pursues a settle and exit strategy). 
From analyzing just these two pattern conflict cases we can see that the 
lawyer's  position in the professional responsibility triangle is similar in 
some ways to the plaintiffs position in the plaintiffs choice triangle .  The 
conflict between the company and the insured provides the lawyer with a 
potential opponent, where before there were two allies. Thus, we might 
call the professional responsibility triangle the "lawyer ' s  choice triangle" 
and anticipate that the lawyer' s  choice, like the plaintiffs, would depend 
on the lawyer' s  interest in the situation. "Lawyer' s  choice" is not, 
however, a comfortable way of thinking about this situation . Indeed, one 
of the goals of insurance and professional responsibility law in this 
situation is precisely to dictate the "choice" that the lawyer must make and 
to structure the l iability insurance relationship in such a way that the 
lawyer does not have an unobserved opportunity to make a contrary 
choice. 
As in the Low Limits Case, the conflict between the company and the 
insured in the Multiple Victim Case has spillover effects in the j ury 
44. See, e.g., Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So. 2d 1 279, 1 288  (La. 1 977) (interpreting 
direct action statute to prohibit company from exhausting an automobi le insurance policy by 
settling with less than all the victims of an accident); Dom v.  Liberty M ut .  Fire Ins. Co., 40 1 
N.  W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. 1 987) (interpreting uninsured motorist statute to prohibit  company 
from exhausting the policy by settling with less than all the victims of an acci dent); see also 
M iller v. Lambert, 464 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va. 1 995) .  This goes some way toward achieving 
Keeton 's preferred solution: a court-ordered allocation of policy proceeds according to the 
"relative settlement value of all claims." Keeton, supra note 4 1 ,  at 52 .  
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(plaintiff-lawyer-insured) and settlement (plaintiff-lawyer-company) 
triangles.  In contrast to the Low Limits Case, however, the incentives 
strengthen the bond between insured and lawyer against the plaintiff in the 
jury triangle and weaken the bond between company and lawyer against 
the plaintiff in the settlement triangle.  The result is that the lawyer in the 
Multiple Victim Case has more incentive to advocate for the insured at the 
settlement table than the lawyer in the Low Limits Case.45 These spillover 
effects are further examples of the effect that the dynamics in one 
component of the l iability insurance relationship can have on others . They 
also i l lustrate the important point that the self interest of the lawyer may 
mitigate the effect that the lawyer' s  long term economic dependence on the 
insurance company has on the lawyer' s  relationship with the insured. This 
may explain the relative paucity of published opinions in which insureds 
challenge a company' s  early settlement of a multiple victim case.46 
B. Shared Claim Risk Resulting from Insurance Coverage 
Uncertainty 
In the second set of pattern cases, the insured and the company share 
the claim risk because there is some uncertainty whether the potential 
damages are covered by the insurance policy. 
1 .  The Misrepresentation Case 
In investigating a serious, but otherwise routine "slip and 
fall " involving a repairman at the home of an insured with 
adequate liability insurance for the resulting claim. the 
company discovered that the insured had been conducting 
business at the home, despite having answered "no " to a 
question in the policy application regarding business at 
the home. The company undertook the defense of the 
insured, but reserved the right to contest its obligation to 
pay any judgment on misrepresentation grounds. 
45 .  Once again, a lawyer whose fees are not based on the number of hours worked may 
have a different incentive. 
46. None of the cases cited in Annotation, Basis and Manner of Distribution Among 
Multiple Claimants of Proceeds of Liability Insurance Policy Inadequate to Pay Claims in 
Full, 70 A. L.R. 2d 4 1 6  ( 1 960), and in the supplements to that annotation through 1 996, 
were brought by insureds to recover money paid to claimants. Instead, the cases all are 
brought by victims who were not fully compensated. 
. � ' j 
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In the Misrepresentation Case, the insured and the company share the 
claim risk because of the uncertainty over insurance coverage for the 
claim. Here the interests of the company and the insured in the defense of 
the l iability claim appear to be aligned: both the company and the insured 
would be better off if the repairman ' s  claim went away; the limits of the 
policy exceed the damages claimed; and there is no obvious way that the 
company could use the control over the claim to improve its 
misrepresentation defense. Thus, the conflict between the insured and the 
company appears to concern only the coverage for the claim. 
Nevertheless, the interests of the company and the insured do conflict 
in the defense and settlement of the liability claim, because the claim and 
the coverage defense intersect in the company 's  valuation of the c laim. As 
a result of the coverage defense, a rational company will value the 
Misrepresentation Case at a discount. The stronger the company' s  
misrepresentation defense, the larger the discount. The larger the discount, 
the less incentive the insurance company has to mount a vigorous defense 
or settle the liability case. Although the company and the insured share the 
risk of having to pay an actual judgment, the company, alone, controls  the 
settlement process.  Accordingly, as in the Low Limits Case, the company 
has an opportunity to "gamble with the insured' s  money." 
In the Low Limits Case, the company would have none of its own 
money to lose if it refused to settle (ignoring for the moment both defense 
costs and the duty to settle). In the Misrepresentation Case, in contrast, the 
company does risk its own money. If the company is  wrong about the 
value of the liability case and the coverage defense, it will have to pay a 
judgment in excess of the settlement amount. Using the gambling 
metaphor, then, we can say that a low limits case offers the company the 
opportunity to place a bet using only the insured ' s  money, while a · I 
coverage defense case requires it to bet some of its own money, too.47 j Nevertheless, a significant conflict of interest remains. Imagine that 
there is a 50% chance of a $ 1 00,000 verdict and 50% chance of a $0 
verdict, so that we can say that the settlement value of the case is $50,000. 
If we also imagine that there is a 50% chance that the company will 
prevail in a coverage case, then the company should be willing to pay no 
4 7 .  Factoring in defense costs reduces the differences between the two types of 
confl icts. The more significant the defense costs are to the overall cost of the claim, the 
more the confl ict present in a l ow l imits case approaches the conflict present in a coverage 
defense case like the M isrepresentation Case ( i . e. ,  in which there is no factual overlap 
between the liability c laim and the coverage defense). 
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more than $25 ,000 to settle the case (ignoring defense and coverage 
litigation costs, which complicate the analysis without changing the point). 
As long as the insured has collectible assets, it would be irrational for the 
plaintiff to settle the case for that amount . Any resulting three-way 
settlement negotiation between the plaintiff, the insured and the company 
presents obvious opportunities for conflict between the company and the 
insured. 
In practice, insureds appear not to contribute to settlements within 
policy limits, at least outside the realm of large scale corporate insurance 
coverage litigation (for example, mass products liability or environmental 
claims) .48 Yet, such cases do settle.49 Does that mean that plaintiffs ignore 
defendants ' other assets, that insurance companies ignore their coverage 
defenses, or that there is some other dynamic at work? Empirical research 
directed at answering these questions would help us better understand the 
role of liability insurance in tort law-in-action. 
Even without such research, however, it is clear that at least one reason 
for the lack of contributions by insureds to within-limit settlements is the 
existence of cases holding that it is a breach of the company's duty of good 
faith to require the insured to pay a portion of a settlement within limits. 5° 
The apparent concern is that the company will use its lower risk aversion 
and greater experience at valuing claims to profit at the insured's  expense. 
Playing the settlement and coverage numbers is the company's business, 
not the insured 's. Indeed, the insured 's aversion to having to play those 
numbers is one of the pillars of the liability insurance business. 5 1  
48.  See Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 56 .  M y  interviews with personal injury lawyers 
corroborated Syverud ' s  report. See Baker, supra note 1 4, for a description of the interviews. 
Not one of the lawyers reported having handled or heard of a personal injury case involving 
an individual or small business insured in which the insured had contributed to a "within 
limits" settlement. I am aware of insured contributions to "within limits" settlements in the 
large scale corporate coverage l i tigation context from my personal involvement in such 
cases. The details of the settlements cannot be provided because of confidential i ty 
provisions in the settlement agreements. 
49. All of the personal i nj ury lawyers interviewed said that it was common practice for 
insurance companies in Florida to settle contested coverage cases. See Baker, supra note 1 4  
(describing the interviews). 
50. See Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 53-57. 
5 1 .  The presence of such settlements i n  the large corporate context is consistent with 
this explanation because, in that context, there is much less risk that a court will act in a 
paternal istic manner to protect the insured. 
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For present purposes, we need not decide whether this paternalistic 
prohibition is good or bad policy.52 It i s  enough to realize that, as this 
prohibition reflects, a coverage defense changes the insurance relationship 
so that the insured and company become adversaries, not only with respect 
to coverage, but also with respect to the defense and settlement of the 
claim. 
Structurally, the conflict in the Misrepresentation Case is  more l ike the 
conflict in the Low Limits Case than the conflict in the Multiple Victim 
Case. The conflict in the Misrepresentation Case encourages an alliance 
between the insured and the plaintiff in favor of settlement, leaving the 
company out in the plaintiffs choice triangle and leaving the lawyer out in 
the jury triangle.  Indeed, because the insurance l imits are more than 
adequate for the c laim, this alliance has the potential to exist even when 
there is a deep pocket defendant. In addition, the conflict encourages an 
alliance between the insured and the lawyer in the professional 
responsibility triangle opposing efforts by the company to shirk in the 
defense and maybe even, for the reasons explored below, in favor of 
settlement. 
In the settlement triangle, the lawyer' s  interests would seem to run 
squarely with the company against the plaintiff (and, thus, against 
settlement unless the plaintiff is willing to reduce the settlement value of 
the case to reflect the coverage uncertainty). What may weaken the bond 
between company and lawyer, however, is the lawyer' s  risk aversion. If 
the claim results in a large, covered verdict, the lawyer may not receive the 
next file from the company. If the case results in an uncovered verdict, the 
lawyer may be on the receiving end of legal proceedings:  at best a 
deposition notice in a failure to settle case against the company; at worst a 
complaint in a malpractice case. 
A settlement ends the case on a less than disastrous note for all the 
people directly involved: the plaintiff, the defendant, the claims adjuster, 
and the lawyer. For this reason, some lawyers assert that contested 
coverage cases are more likely to settle than uncontested coverage 
52. At least in the abstract, such settlements could be in the insured 's  interest, in effect 
providing the insured the opportunity to purchase insurance against the risk of losing the 
l iability claim and the subsequent coverage case. Cf Syverud, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 5 7  
(observing that contributions b y  insureds to within limits settlements can b e  understood in  
the context of  a low l imits case as  insurance "against the risk of an  excess judgment"). 
I 
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cases53-this notwithstanding my earlier observation that the settlement 
value of the case to the company would seem to be much lower than the 
settlement value of the case to the plaintiff. True or not, 54 this assertion 
suggests, once again, that the common assumption that it is in the lawyer' s  
interest to align with the company against the insured may not always hold 
true. 
2. The Separation Assault 
Following a legal separation in an abusive marriage, the 
insured regularly stalked his wife. One evening, in a 
drunken rage, the insured shot his wife 's boyfriend and 
then himself Both survived. The boyfriend filed suit 
against the husband, who requested a defense from his 
homeowners ' insurance company. The company agreed to 
defend the case, but reserved the right to contest its 
obligation to pay any judgment on the grounds that the 
husband intended the harm. 55 
This case presents the same settlement and defense conflicts as the 
Misrepresentation Case, plus an additional conflict arising from the factual 
overlap between the liability and coverage aspects of the case. The 
company would benefit from a factual finding in the liability case that the 
insured shot the boyfriend with the intent sufficient to meet the standard 
for the company' s  intentional harm defense. For the insured, that finding 
would be a disaster, leading to both a large adverse judgment and the loss 
53. See, e.g., Interview with Insurance Defense Lawyer (name confidential), in M iami, 
Fla. (May I, 1 996). For a description of the interviews, see B aker, supra note 1 4. 
54. This is a question that is ripe for empirical testing. Unlike many such questions, i t  
actually seems testable. Indeed, as long as  a company's  claim data base contains a field 
indicating whether a reservation of rights letter was sent and a field indicating whether the 
case settled before trial, running a simple cross tabulation would be easy. 
55 .  This hypothetical is  loosely modeled on State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v .  Wicka, 474 
N. W.2d 324 (Minn. 1 99 1  ). The court in Wicka affirmed a judgment against the insurance 
company, based on a jury finding that the assailant lacked the capacity to form the intent 
necessary to bring the case within the scope of the expected or intended exclusion. If we 
understand that exclusion to address the problem of moral hazard-changed behavior 
attributable to insurance--then a very high standard of intent in such separation assault 
coverage disputes is good policy, because it is highly unlikely that separation assaults are 
affected by insurance incentives. 
1 j 
j 
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of coverage .56 Thus, this case differs structurally from the 
Misrepresentation Case because there is  a potential community of interest 
between the plaintiff and the company: provided the insured has other 
collectible assets, both company and plaintiff gain by proving that the 
insured intended to harm the plaintiff. 57 
In the professional responsibility triangle, the insured and the lawyer 
share an interest in preventing the company from shirking in the defense, 
and the lawyer has a long term interest in assisting the company. In this 
sense, the Separation Assault is no different than the other pattern cases .  
But, the Separation Case is like the Low Limits Case (and unlike the 
Multiple Victim and Misrepresentation cases) in that it presents the lawyer 
with the opportunity to further both interests:  receiving fees for a thorough 
defense of the liability claim while helping the company shift claim risk to 
the insured. 
The Separation Assault case differs from the Low Limits Case, 
however, in terms of the pressure exerted by relationships outside the 
professional responsibility triangle. In the Low Limits Case, the potential 
alliance between the insured and plaintiff against the lawyer tempered the 
lawyer' s  interest in helping the company shift claim risk to the insured. 
Here, in contrast, if the plaintiff prefers an alliance with the company, the 
plaintiff will not pressure the lawyer to place the insured ' s  interests ahead 
of the company' s .  Indeed, the logical extension of the lawyer' s  economic 
dependence on the company and the company' s  alliance with the plaintiff 
would be for the lawyer in effect to work with the plaintiff against the 
insured in the jury triangle. 
Accordingly, the Separation Assault Case presents the strongest 
potential constellation of interests against the insured yet seen: two against 
one in the plaintiff' s choice triangle, the professional responsibility 
triangle and even the jury triangle. And, in contrast to the prior cases, no 
one may be pressing for a settlement in the settlement triangle .  
Thus, i t  is not surprising that many jurisdictions have adopted a shift in 
control strategy to assist the insured in this kind of case. In these 
56. Even if the j urisdiction did not permit offensive collateral estoppel, the finding in 
the first case would affect the settlement value of the coverage case: the fact that one j ury 
found that the insured intended the harm clearly would affect the lawyers' evaluation of 
whether a second jury would do so and thereby reduce the settlement value of the coverage 
claim. 
57 .  If the insured lacks significant collectible assets, the likely alliance is between 
insured and plaintiff, with the result that the interests would more nearly match those in the 
M isrepresentation Case. 
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jurisdictions, when a company raises a coverage defense that turns on 
issues that are relevant to the liability claim, the company gives up the 
right to defend the insured.58 Of course, this means the insured now 
controls the defense at the company' s  expense, raising the ex post moral 
hazard problem that motivated the insurance contract provisions assigning 
control to the insurance company. Perhaps as a result, insurance law 
seems to tolerate the company placing some limits on the defense, such as 
requiring the insured ' s  lawyer to accept payment at the company' s  usual 
rate and that the lawyer be experienced in defending civil claims. 59 
If the shift in control is only partial, so that the company retains control 
over settlement of the claim, a significant settlement conflict remains. As 
with the defense conflict just discussed, this settlement conflict is more 
acute than the corresponding conflict in the Misrepresentation Case. 
Keeping the l iability case "alive" in the Separation Assault Case benefits 
the company in a way that keeping the liability case alive in the 
Misrepresentation Case does not. As long as the Separation Assault 
l iability case continues, there remains the chance that the plaintiff will 
reveal or prove facts helpful to the company' s  coverage defense. Once the 
plaintiff settles with the insured, however, the plaintiff is no longer adverse 
to the insured and, thus, wil l  be less helpful to the company ' s  position 
against the insured. As a result, the company has less incentive in the 
Separation Case to reach a settlement with the insured and the plaintiff that 
resolves at least the l iability aspects of the case . By contrast, in the 
Misrepresentation Case, if the parties can agree on the value of the liability 
claim, it may be in both the company ' s  and the plaintiff s  interest to settle 
that claim and then l itigate the real issue : whether there is insurance 
coverage for the claim. 
3.  The Softball Case 
The company hired a lawyer to defend what seemed to be 
a routine negligence claim filed by a spectator injured at a 
high school softball game. During informal interviews, 
two potential witnesses told the defense lawyer that the 
insured had deliberately thrown her bat at the plaintiff, 
who had been heckling the insured. The lawyer talked to 
58 .  See, e.g. , CAL . Clv. CODE § 2860  (West 1 993); Thornton v .  Paul, 3 84 N.E.2d 335  
( I l l .  1978) .  See generally Wil l iam T. Barker, The Right and Duty to Defend: Conflicts of 
Interest and Insurer Control of the Defense, 1 992 A.B.A.  SEC. OF TORTS & INS. PRAC. 1 95 .  
59. See, e.g. , CAL. Clv. CODE § 2860(c) (West 1 993) .  
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the insured, who denied the story. When the lawyer next 
talked to the two potential witnesses, they said they had 
since spoken to the plaintiff's lawyer, who told them that 
the plaintiff would prefer to treat the incident as an 
accident and that they would not be needed as witnesses in 
the case. 
[Vol. 4: I 
The Softball Case is a latent Separation Assault Case. The immediate 
conflict between the insured and the company lies in the use of the 
information from the potential witnesses. The insured would prefer that 
the company never learn about these witnesses .60 The company would 
prefer to have the information in order to determine whether to make any 
additional investigation and, eventually, whether to raise a coverage 
defense. 
Here, the plaintiff s  lawyer' s  statement to the witnesses (that the 
plaintiff prefers to treat the case as an accident) strongly suggests that the 
plaintiff has chosen an implicit alliance with the insured.6 1  Either the 
insured lacks collectible assets or the plaintiff has decided that it will be 
easier to obtain a settlement from the company than it would from the 
insured . As a result, the interests in this case line up much like the 
interests in the Misrepresentation Case: the plaintiff and the insured allied 
against the company in the plaintiff s  choice triangle and against the 
lawyer in the jury triangle, with the goal of creating pressure for 
settlement. 
The difference is that, as in the Separation Assault, the company has an 
enhanced incentive to enlist the lawyer in an alliance against the insured 
and, thus, a correspondingly greater interest in preventing the lawyer from 
allying with the insured and the plaintiff. At the same time, however, the 
lawyer has a significant interest in withholding the information, at l east in 
j urisdictions that adopt the shift in control strategy described above. 
Providing the information increases the likelihood that the Softball case 
will become a Separation Assault case, with the likely result that the 
insurance defense lawyer will lose the file (to an "independent" lawyer 
60. The insured has this preference whether or not she "in fact" intended the harm. 
Thus, the conflict does not depend on a fraudulent intent on the part of the insured. 
6 1 .  For a nuanced discussion of the "underlitigation" strategy that follows from such an 
alliance, see Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for 
Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L .  REV. I 72 I ( 1 997) .  
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selected by the insured).62 Once again, the self-interest of the lawyer may 
mitigate the presumed tendency of the lawyer to favor the interests of the 
company over the insured. 
C. Shared claim risk from uncovered harm 
In the third set of pattern conflict cases, the company and the insured 
share the claim risk because the insured faces a kind of harm that is not 
covered by the insurance policy. In the Food Poisoning Case that harm is 
damage to the insured ' s  reputation. In the Punitive Damages Case that 
harm is punitive damages in a jurisdiction in which such damages are 
uninsurable . 
1 .  The Food Poisoning Case 
An insured restaurant faces a food poisoning claim. The 
company 's claims manager believes that the plaintiff's 
case is weak on causation grounds. The restaurant owner 
believes that litigation of the case would cause negative 
publicity that would decrease sales. The plaintiff offers a 
pre-suit settlement of the claim for an amount that is 
greater than what the claims manager reasonably believes 
to be the present value of the expected judgment in the 
case (adjusted for the plaintiff's probability of success) but 
less than what the restaurant owner reasonably believes to 
be the sum of that present value plus the reputational harm 
the plaintiff can cause the restaurant. 
In the Food Poisoning Case, the insured bears claim risk because there 
is more at stake than a potential judgment. This case is the reverse of the 
often discussed malpractice settlement conflict. 63 In malpractice cases, 
insureds sometimes oppose settlement because of reputational concerns.64 
Here, in contrast, the insured prefers settlement because of reputational 
concerns. The conflict between the company and the insured arises from 
the nature of the risk transferred by the liability insurance contract. The 
contract obligates the company "to pay those sums that the insured 
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
63. See, e.g. , Note, An Insurer 's Right to Settle Versus Its Duty to Defend 
Nonmeritorious Medical Malpractice Claims, 1 6  J. LEGAL M ED. 545 ( 1 995). 
64. See. e.g., Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians'  Prof!  Liab. Ins .  Trust, 
570 So. 2d 1 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 990), ajf'd, 59 1 So. 2d 1 74 (Fla. 1 992). 
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becomes legally obligated to pay as damages"65 ; it does not obligate the 
company to compensate the insured for damaged reputation . 
The conflict in the Food Poisoning Case is similar to the conflicts in 
the preceding cases.  Because the company and the insured share the claim 
risk, the company has less incentive to defend and settle the case than 
would a defendant without insurance .  Indeed, if we analogize the 
reputational harm at risk in the Food Poisoning Case to a judgment in 
excess of the insurance policy limits, the interests in this case l ine up much 
like the interests in the Low Limits Case. For example, the plaintiff and 
insured would be allied in favor of settlement against the company in the 
plaintiff s  choice triangle and against the lawyer in the jury triangle .  
There i s ,  however, an important difference between the two cases.  In 
the Low Limits Case, the duty to settle requires the company to evaluate 
the settlement offer as if it bore all the claim risk. In the Food Poisoning 
Case, in contrast, the duty to settle does not require the company to 
evaluate the settlement offer as if it bore all the claim risk. Requiring the 
company to do so would have the effect of eliminating the "as damages" 
limit and indemnifying the insured for reputational harm. 
I do not mean to suggest that the company has no obligation to 
consider the consequences that its actions may have for the insured, but 
simply to observe that whatever obligation the company does have, it 
cannot be required to pay a settlement that takes into account the full 
reputational harm faced by the insured. Thus, there almost inevitably will 
be a gap in such a case between what the settlement value of the case 
would be for a solvent, uninsured defendant and what the settlement value 
of the case would be to a liability insurance carrier. As a result, if the 
plaintiff demands a large settlement premium that is based on its ability to 
damage the insured's reputation (and, providing the insured has assets, 
what rational plaintiff would not?),  the company effectively would be 
relieved of the obligation to settle the case. 
Another difference between the Food Poisoning Case and the Low 
Limits Case relates to the nature of the claim risk borne by the insured.  
The claim risk borne by the insured in the Low Limits Case is  a risk that 
the company willingly would have borne had a higher premium been paid. 
What is at stake in the conflict between the company and the insured, 
65 .  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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therefore, is simply the amount of a given type of risk that is transferred at 
. . 66 a given pnce. 
In the Food Poisoning Case, in contrast, the claim risk borne by the 
insured is not a risk for which coverage is  openly available on the 
insurance market. There is no "lost profits" endorsement available for 
purchase in the liability insurance market. Thus, adjusting the incentives 
in this case could shift to the company a different kind of risk than is  
typical ly understood to be transferred by l iability insurance. Accordingly, 
what is potentially at stake in the conflict between company and insured in 
the Food Poisoning case is the nature of the risk against which liability 
insurance protection will be available.67 
In this situation, neither the company ' s  indemnity obligations nor its 
duty to settle would give the company an incentive to reduce the c laim risk 
faced by the insured. Indeed, if there is  a realistic possibility that the risk 
of reputational harm could lead the insured to decide to take over the case 
and abandon coverage, the company has an incentive to increase that risk. 
This creates a potential community of interest between the plaintiff and the 
company. Although neither the company nor the plaintiff can directly 
benefit from the reputational harm, each can benefit from the insured' s  
desire to avoid that consequence. The plaintiff increases the settlement 
price, and the company avoids having to defend and pay the claim. 
Like the Multiple Victim Case and the Separation Assault Case, then, 
the Food Poisoning Case presents an opportunity for a tacit alliance 
between the company and the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff chooses that 
alliance will ,  of course, depend on such circumstances as the amount of 
collectible assets held by the insured, the relationship between the value of 
the likely judgment and the reputational harm in the case, and so forth. 
The interests of the lawyer may provide some counterbalance to this 
tacit alliance. It is in the lawyer' s  interest that the company rej ect an early 
settlement offer, but that the insured not be so threatened that it takes over 
the case from the company and replaces the lawyer. 68 Thus, it is in the 
lawyer' s  interest to manage the case so as to minimize the non-judgment 
risk faced by the insured. 
66. This is also true of the M isrepresentation Case: the disclosure of the business at 
home most l ikely would not have caused the company to reject the appl ication, although it 
may have increased the premium. 
67. This is also true of the Separation Assault Case and the Punit ive Damages Case: 
coverage is  not generally openly available for intentional harm or in some jurisdictions for 
punitive damages. See Baker, supra note 22.  
68 .  Once again, thi s  incentive assumes an hourly fee arrangement. 
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2. The Punitive Damages Case 
After leaving a bar at closing, an insured driver drove 
through a red light and hit a pedestrian in a crosswalk. 
The driver stopped, backed up, drove around the victim 
(now lying badly injured in the street), and proceeded to 
an after hours club, where he was later arrested and 
charged with driving while intoxicated and leaving the 
scene of an accident. The victim survived to bring a 
compensatory and punitive damages claim. Punitive 
damages are not insurable in the jurisdiction. 
[Vol. 4: I 
On these facts, the victim has a c lear right to compensatory damages 
and a strong claim for punitive damages.69 The insured bears claim risk 
because the company is not required to pay a punitive damages verdict. 
The conflict between the insured and the company concerns the level o f  
defense effort t o  devote t o  the case a s  well  a s  the allocation o f  any 
settlement or verdict to these two categories of damages. 70 
From the plaintiff s  perspective this case is a combination o f  the 
Separation Assault and Softball cases on the one hand and the Low Limits 
Case on the other. If the insured does not have significant, collectible 
assets, then the plaintiff has no financial interest in obtaining a punitive 
damages judgment Uust as the plaintiff in the Softball Case appeared to 
have no financial interest in proving intentional harm). Indeed, because 
plaintiffs ' lawyers commonly believe that a large punitive damages verdict 
is likely to be accompanied by a smaller compensatory damages verdict 
than would be the case in the absence of the punitive damages verdict, the 
plaintiff in a drunk driving case without a "deep pocket" defendant is  
69. Florida personal injury lawyers characterized a driving while intoxicated c laim as  a 
good punitive damages case, particularly if the i nsured left the scene. See, e.g., Interview 
with Insurance Defense Lawyer (name confidential), in M iami, Fla. (May 1 7 , 1 996) ,  quoted 
in Baker, supra note 1 4. 
70. See Nandorf v. CNA Ins. Co.,  479 N.E. 2d 988 ( I l l .  I 985)  (holding that because of 
the conflict between the insured and the company in a case involving a small c laim for 
compensatory damages and a large claim for punitive damages, the insured i s  entitled to an 
independent counsel at the company's expense); but see Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the 
Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 476, 5 0 1  ( 1 996) 
(asserting that a claim for uninsurable punitive damages does not create a conflict-without 
considering the settlement point made in the text above or the conflict addressed in 
Nandorf). 
1 
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likely to request little or no punitive damages from the jury.7 1 S imilarly, if 
the insured has no substantial assets, the plaintiff is likely to handle the 
Punitive Damages Case like the Low Limits Case : offering to settle the 
case within policy limits and then pursuing a failure to settle case in the 
event of a punitive damages verdict. 72 
If the defendant has substantial other assets, however, the plaintiff s  
litigation strategy will be quite different. In that event, the interests o f  the 
plaintiff and the company may align, much as in the Separation Assault 
case. If the company's  limits are high enough, the best strategy for 
reducing the company's  liability and increasing the plaintiff s  recovery 
may well be to contain the compensatory damages by boosting the punitive 
damages claim. 73 Thus, provided the insured has assets, the Punitive 
Damages Case presents the same constellation of interests against the 
plaintiff as the Separation Assault Case: two against one in the plaintiff s  
choice triangle, the professional responsibility triangle and even the j ury 
triangle,  with no one pushing for settlement in the settlement triangle. 
And, in contrast to the Separation Assault Case, the insured ' s  claim for 
7 1 .  See Baker, supra note 1 4. It is worth noting this ability to transform punitive into 
compensatory damages means that a settlement premium based on the plaintiff s  abil ity to 
obtain a punitive damages award differs from a settlement premium based on the plaintiff s  
abi l i ty t o  damage the insured's reputation because the ability t o  harm the defendant' s  
reputation cannot b e  used t o  increase a compensatory damages judgment, whereas the 
plaintiff s  ability to obtain punitive damages can. See id. Thus, a settlement premium 
demanded because of the plainti ffs abi l i ty to inflict an uninsured punitive damages 
judgment should not necessarily relieve the company of the duty to settle the case. Cf Lira 
v. Shelter Ins. Co., 9 1 3  P.2d 5 1 4  (Colo. 1 996) (majority and dissent review case law on 
duty to settle a punitive damages c laim). 
72. See Baker, supra note 1 4  (reporting that defense lawyers analogized punitive 
damages cases to low limits cases for duty-to-settle purposes). 
73. This strategy seems most l ikely to be fruitful in jurisdictions in which the duty to 
settle does not obligate the company to protect the insured from a punitive damages verdict. 
See, e.g. , Lira, 9 1 3  P .2d at 5 1 6  ("[a]n insurer who has not contracted to insure against its 
insured's  l iability for punitive damges has no duty to settle the compensatory part of the 
claim to minimize the insured's exposure to punitive damages"). In such a jurisdiction, a 
company that has rejected a policy l imits settlement offer would have great incentive to have 
the jury release its anger on the punitive damages l ine on the verdict form, not the 
compensatory damages line. Other jurisdictions appear to require the company to provide at 
least some protection against a punitive damages verdict. See Magnum Foods, Inc. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1 49 1 ,  1 506 ( l Oth Cir 1 994) ("the good faith duty thus 
requires cooperative efforts by [company] with [insured] throughout to handle and settle the 
entire case"). In  my view, the former approach wrongly ignores the fact that punitive 
damages can be "transformed" into compensatory damages. See Baker, supra note 1 4. 
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control over the insurance defense lawyer is quite weak. Indeed, 
California's  "Cumis" statute explicitly states that a claim for pumtlve 
damages does not entitle the insured to a company-funded independent 
defense lawyer.74 
III . THE DUTY TO DEFEND WHOM AGAINST WHAT? 
As the preceding discussion has i llustrated, triangularity is a 
multifaceted feature of the liability insurance relationship . Typically, 
courts and professional responsibility specialists worry about that 
triangularity because the insurance defense lawyer' s  financial interests are 
so closely tied to the company that the lawyer seems destined to become 
the company' s  instrument for shifting risk to the insured.75 Factoring the 
plaintiff into the relationship complicates that worry. On the one hand, the 
concern that the lawyer will sacrifice the insured is increased by potential 
alliances between plaintiff and company, as illustrated most c learly by the 
Separation Assault Case and the Punitive Damages Case and also, 
potentially, by the Multiple Victim Case and the Food Poisoning Case. On 
the other hand, the potential alliance between plaintiff and insured raises 
concerns about the lawyer shifting risk to the company, as seems likely in 
the Softball Case and at least possible in the Low Limits Case and the 
Misrepresentation Case. 
Complicating the question "who is  taking advantage of whom" does 
not change the existence of the conflict between the company and the 
insured, nor the need to decide the scope of representation that the duty to 
defend requires .  Insurance law plainly does not require the company to 
engage a lawyer to represent all the interests of the insured potentially at 
issue in a claim. For example, the company would not be required to retain 
a lawyer to defend the insured in a criminal proceeding arising out of the 
Separation Assault, even though the outcome could have obvious relevance 
both to the value of, and insurance for, the claim.76 Nor, in either the 
74. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2860 (West 1 993) .  In Nandorf, 479 N .E.2d at 9 8 8 ,  the 
I l l inois court pennitted the insured to hire independent counsel at the company's  expense, 
but the facts in that case were quite exceptional. In the underlying claim at i ssue in 
Nandorf, only nominal compensatory damages were sought, with the result that the whole 
case was really about punitive damages. In that special case, the court held that the 
company cannot be counted upon to provide a defense that is  adequate to the risk at stake. 
75 .  See, e.g. , CHI of Alaska v. Employers Reinsurance Corp . ,  844 P .2d 1 1 1 3 , 1 1 1 6 
(Alaska 1 993) and sources cited therein. 
76. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 292. 
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Separation Assault Case or the Misrepresentation Case would the company 
be required to engage a lawyer to represent the insured in any related 
insurance coverage litigation. 77 The challenge is to define the scope of the 
defense lawyer ' s  representation of the insured in a manner that provides 
meaningful guidance to the real people who navigate through the l iability 
insurance tetrahedron. 
A. A Judgment Risk Approach to the Duty to Defend 
In "The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers," 
Professor Charles Silver and Dean Kent Syverud considered the scope of 
the insurance defense lawyer' s  representation of the insured in the context 
78 of what they call the full coverage case. By a "full coverage" case they 
mean a case in which the limits of the insurance policy exceed the damages 
sought by the plaintiff and in which the company has no present basis for 
expressing any doubt about the obligation to indemnify the insured against 
those damages.79 In such a case, they conclude that the duty to defend 
obligates the company to retain a lawyer to conduct a defense that 
minimizes the size and probability of a plaintiff s  judgment in the case and, 
consistent with that primary goal, minimizes the costs of defense.  80 Thus, 
with respect to the insured--who does not bear the costs of defense-the 
scope of the lawyer' s  representation is the minimization of the size and 
probability of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. For this reason, I refer 
to Silver and Svyerud ' s  approach as a "judgment risk" approach to the duty 
to defend. 
In the paragraphs that follow, I use the pattern cases and the concept of 
claim risk and its components to extend this judgment risk approach 
beyond the full coverage situations Silver and Syverud considered.  This 
extension is possible because the company and the insured can share the 
c laim risk even in a "full coverage" case of the sort that Silver and Syverud 
77 .  I f  the insured is successful in that insurance coverage l itigation, the company may 
well have to pay the insured's  legal fees, but the insured bears those fees in the first 
instance. See Baker, supra note I 0 at 1 424. 
78. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5 .  
7 9 .  See id. at 263 . 
80. The most direct statement Si lver and Syverud make on thi s  point i s  that the 
company has a duty "to provide a lawyer to defend the insured." !d. at 300-0 I .  Nowhere 
do they succinctly define what they mean by "defend the insured," but a careful reading of 
their analysis leads me to the judgment risk description. See, e.g. , id. at 329-3 1 (discussing 
scope of lawyer's representation in a case in which there is  a confl ict between the insured's  
reputational interest and the company's i nterest i n  minimizing the cost of the claim). 
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addressed. This risk sharing can occur for one of two reasons:  either the 
c laim has consequences for the insured beyond a potential plaintiff s  
judgment (as in the Food Poisoning Case) or there is  the potential for the 
company later to learn of circumstances that would lead it to express 
uncertainty about its obligation to pay the claim (as in the Softball case) . 
These two types of cases--both of which Silver and Syverud considered­
present all the essential elements of shared claim risk that occur in the 
other pattern cases. 
Indeed, the Softball Case presents most of these elements.  These 
elements can be illustrated by thinking of the insured's claim risk in the 
Softball Case as the product of the fol lowing six factors: 
( 1 )  the probability that the company learns of 
information suggesting that the insured intended the harm, 
(2) the probability that this information would lead the 
company to reserve its right to litigate coverage for the 
claim, 
(3) the probability that the company would not settl e  
the claim, 
(4) the probability of a plaintiff s  verdict should the 
company not settle, 
(5) the probability that the insured would lose a 
subsequent coverage case, and 
(6) the dollar amount of the likely plaintiff s  verdict in 
the liability case. 
The "judgment risk" portion of this equation is the product of factors 
(4) and (6) : the probability of a plaintiff s  verdict multiplied by the likely 
dollar amount of that verdict. 
The portion of that judgment risk borne by the insured is a function of 
the remaining factors in the equation. Factors (1 ) ,  (2), and (5) are all part 
of what I refer to as the "coverage risk" component of the claim risk, and 
factor (3) is what I call the "settlement risk" component. In Silver and 
Syverud's analysis,  both of these components lie outside the scope of the 
defense lawyer' s representation of the insured. 81 Thus, we might say that, 
8 1 .  See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 343-48 (stating that the lawyer has an 
obligation to turn over all information relevant to the defense of the case, even if harmful to 
the insured' s  coverage case), at 296-99 (stating that the company i s  not required to retain 
the lawyer to represent the insured with respect to settlement), and at 293  (stating their 
l 
1 
l j 
I 
1 
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under a judgment risk approach to the duty to defend, the lawyer represents 
the insured for the purpose of minimizing the total judgment risk in the 
case, but not for the purpose of reducing the insured ' s  share of that risk. 
Silver and Syverud did not directly address limited coverage cases .  
Nevertheless, the claim risk faced b y  insureds in limited coverage cases i s  
essentially the same a s  the claim risk presented i n  a latent limited coverage 
case like the Softball Case. 
In the Separation Assault Case and the Misrepresentation Case, the 
insured' s  claim risk is the product of factors (3) through (6) from the 
Softball Case above: the judgment risk (factors (4) and (6)), the settlement 
risk (factor (3)), and the risk that a court will determine that the c laim is 
not covered (factor (5)). In the Low Limits Case and the Punitive Damages 
Case, the insured ' s  claim risk is the product of four similar factors : 
(a) the probability that the company will not settle the 
case, 
(b) the probability of an excess or punitive damages 
verdict if the company does not settle, 
(c) the probability of losing a subsequent failure to 
settle case, and 
(d) the size of the excess or punitive damages verdict 
that the insured would have to pay as a result. 
Factors (b) and (d) from this list are part of the j udgment risk; factor 
(a) is the same as the settlement risk present in the preceding cases; and 
factor (c) is a form of coverage risk. As in the Softball Case, the judgment 
"preliminary conclusion" that the lawyer does not represent the insured with respect to 
coverage and should not provide coverage advice). 
As Silver & Syverud are careful to make clear, deciding that these factors lie outside 
the scope of the defense lawyer's  representation would not mean that the lawyer would have 
no professional responsibi l ities with respect to those factors. For example, if the insured 
directed the defense lawyer not to supply the information in the Softball Case to the 
company, Si lver & Syverud would agree that the lawyer could not do so. Under the canons 
of professional responsibi l i ty,  a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the cl i ent that precludes 
disobeying instructions. The proper course for the lawyer under Si lver & Syverud' s  
approach would be  to inform the insured that the lawyer' s  duty of  loyalty to  the company 
requires the lawyer to provide the information to the company, unless the insured instructs 
the lawyer to the contrary, and that, if the insured did instruct the lawyer to the contrary, the 
duty of loyalty to the company would require the lawyer to withdraw from the case. See id. 
at 359-6 1 .  
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risk approach would assign the lawyer to represent the insured with respect 
to the judgment risk, but not the settlement or coverage risk. 
In the Food Poisoning Case (and in the analogous case addressed by 
Silver and Syverud82) ,  the damages sought by the plaintiff are well within 
the limits of the policy, and there is  no doubt that the claim is  covered by 
the policy. As a result, the insured does not bear any judgment risk. All 
the risk the insured bears is non-judgment risk, and under a judgment risk 
approach to the duty to defend, the company would have no obligation to 
retain the defense lawyer to represent the insured with respect to that risk. 83 
Looking at these pattern cases together, we can see that the judgment 
risk approach to the duty to defend leaves the insured on its own with 
respect to three kinds of claim risk: settlement risk, coverage risk, and a 
catch-all category I call ,.'non-judgment risk" that is illustrated by the 
reputational risk in the Food Poisoning case. 
If we understand the company' s  duty to defend as derived from the 
duty to indemnify,84 then excluding both the coverage risk and the other 
non-judgment risk from the scope of the lawyer' s  representation makes 
good intuitive sense. (I will address settlement risk in a separate section 
below.) The duty to defend does not encompass coverage risk because, by 
definition, the company has no duty to indemnify a non-covered claim. 
Similarly, the duty to defend does not encompass non-judgment risk 
because the insurance policy limits the company' s  indemnity obligation to 
"pay those sums the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages," which 
does not include collateral harm to the insured (as opposed to a third party) 
resulting from a claim. Thus, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to 
indemnify, but the duty to defend is broader only in the sense that the 
82. In Si lver & Syverud's  hypothetical the insured is concerned that l i tigation of the 
case would reveal h i s  marital infidel ity. See id. at 327.  
83 .  See id. at 327-3 1 .  
84. This i s  the way standard l iabil ity i nsurance policies define the duty. See supra note 
I I  ("We wil l  pay those sums that the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages . . .  We 
will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking those damages."). It is also the way 
that courts describe the duty to defend. See, e.g., Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins .  Co. ,  267  A.2d 7 
(N.J .  1 970) ("[t)he sense of the covenant i s  to defend c laims which the carrier would be 
required to pay if  the c laimant prevailed in the action. . . . The obligation to defend 
'groundless, false or fraudulent' clai ms does not mean that the carrier will defend c laims 
which would be beyond the covenant to pay i f  the carrier prevailed"); Gray v. Zurich, 4 1 9  
P .2d 1 68 ,  1 76 (Cal . 1 966) ("[a]n insurer, therefore, bears a duty to defend i ts i nsured 
whenever it ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of l iabil ity [ i .e . ,  an obl igation to 
i ndemnify the insured] under the po l icy"). 
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company must defend the case as if there were no doubt about coverage, 
unless and until non-coverage is conclusively proven. 85 
B. Defense Lawyers and Settlement Risk 
As I have just described, excluding coverage risk and other non­
judgement risk from the scope of the defense lawyer' s  representation of the 
insured can be justified by reference to limits on the duty to indemnify and 
the derivative nature of the duty to defend. That justification cannot be 
used to exclude settlement risk from the scope of representation. Indeed, 
the company's  duty to settle exists precisely because the company' s  duty 
to indemnify is limited. If the company' s  duty to indemnify were 
unlimited, the insured would face no risk from the company' s  failure to 
settle and, thus, there would be no need for a duty to settle. Accordingly, 
limits on the duty to indemnify provide no logical basis for concluding that 
settlement lies outside the scope of the duty to indemnify or its derivative, 
the duty to defend. 
Moreover, it is historical happenstance that the duty to settle evolved 
out of the duty to indemnify. The duty to settle can also be seen as an 
extension of the duty to defend. After all, what better way is there to 
minimize the judgment risk than to settle the case? Furthermore, because 
settlements are also a means of avoiding defense costs, it is not hard to 
erode the defense - settlement distinction.86 
This does not mean, however, that the scope of the defense lawyer' s  
representation of the insured should include settlement. In the ordinary 
85 .  There i s  a useful symmetry between the proposition that the duty to defend requires 
the company to defend the c laim "as if there were full coverage" for any resulting judgment 
and the proposition that the duty to settle requires the company to evaluate settlements "as if 
there were no l imits" on the dollar amount of coverage. Both propositions simplify, in a 
helpful way, some of the complexities of the l iabi l i ty insurance relationship. Both, at least 
in theory, help contain the conflict between company and insured. And both are l ikely in  
fact to  provide significant protection to  the insured, because both also benefit another party 
to the l iabil ity insurance relationship. The plaintiff stands to benefit from the duty to settle 
and, for that reason, has an incentive to construct its case in a manner that protects the 
insured's right to a settlement within l imits. The defense lawyer stands to benefit from the 
requirement that the company defend the case "as if' i t  were fully covered and, thus, has an 
incentive to defend the case in that manner. 
86. This may explain why there are, at least to my knowledge, no l iabil i ty i nsurance 
policies that provide only defense coverage. For an argument that there should be such 
liabi l i ty insurance defense-only policies, see Alan Widiss, Abrogating the Right and Duty of 
Liability Insurers to Defend Their Insureds: The Case for Separating the Obligation to 
Indemnify from the Defense of Insureds, 5 1  OHIO L.J. 9 1 7  ( 1 990). 
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case it is the company that controls  settlement and, therefore, an insured 
wishing to settle a case must convince the company to do so.87 As a result, 
including settlement in the scope of the lawyer' s  representation of the 
insured is problematic from the perspective of preserving the "triangular 
relationship [between insured, lawyer and company] in its normal state."88  
If the defense lawyer represents the insured with respect to settlement, the 
defense lawyer would become the insured' s  advocate to the company. In 
that setting, it is very difficult to think of the insured and the company on 
an equal footing in a "normal" triangular relationship. Instead, the insured 
would be the lawyer ' s  "friend" and the company, the lawyer' s  "enemy" .89 
Thus, one reason to exclude settlement from the scope of the defense 
lawyer' s  representation of the insured is to minimize the frequency of overt 
conflicts in the professional responsibility triangle. Indeed, because an 
insured almost always would prefer a settlement, even when the insured 
bears essentially no claim risk, including settlement within the scope of 
representation of the insured would seem to make client conflicts the  usual, 
rather than the exceptional, lot of the insurance defense lawyer. 
Ultimately, however, this reason is unsatisfactory because the lawyer' s  
responsibilities in the face of the conflict can easily be addressed by 
directing the lawyer to privilege one or the other client in settlement 
conflict situations. Indeed, in practice this appears to be exactly what 
happens. Insurance defense lawyers typically represent the company, and 
not the insured, with respect to settlement.90 Including settlement in the 
scope of the lawyer' s representation of the insured would simply reverse 
that situation, so that the insurance defense lawyer would represent the 
insured, not the company, with respect to settlement. In that event, we can 
expect a rational insurance company either to retain a second lawyer to 
87 .  The qualification in this sentence reflects the fact that in disputed coverage 
s i tuations insurance law may permit the insureds to settle directly with claimants and then 
l itigate coverage with the company. See. e.g., Thornton v. Paul, 384 N.E.2d 3 3 5  ( I l l .  1 978). 
8 8 .  Hazard, supra note I ,  at 38 .  
89 .  See id. a t  2 1  (citing Charles Fried, The Lawyer as  Friend: The Moral Foundations 
of the Lawyer-Clien t  Relationship, 85 YALE L.J .  I 060 ( 1 976)). 
90. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 295.  Cf Keeton, supra note 3, at 1 1 68-7 1 
(arguing that thi s  arrangement is proper). The defense lawyers interviewed in connection 
with my punitive damages study, see Baker, supra note 1 4, confirmed this practice. The 
exception to the general rule occurs not when the i nsurance defense lawyer represents the 
insured with respect to settlement, but rather when the lawyer does not handle settlement for 
either c l ient- because an adjuster or company counsel (who does not represent the insured 
for any purpose) is handling the settlement. 
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handle the settlement or to expand the duties o f  the claims adj uster to 
include settlement. Both seem likely to increase the company' s  cost o f  
handling claims. The question i s  whether this extra cost would b e  so 
clearly outweighed by benefits to insureds that legal intervention to change 
the current practice appears justified. 
For defendants with significant assets to protect, including settlement 
within the scope of the insurance defense lawyer' s  representation of the 
insured would seem to provide very l ittle benefit. For the reasons explored 
in Part II, a defendant with significant assets to protect in a shared claim 
risk situation is unlikely to conclude that a lawyer selected and controlled 
by the company would be sufficiently loyal to serve as the insured' s  sole 
representative for settlement purposes. As the l iability insurance 
tetrahedron makes clear, in a shared claim risk situation there are simply 
too many opportunities for the interests of the company and the plaintiff to 
intersect for a wise insured with assets to protect not to seek personal 
counsel .  Once the insured retains personal counsel, there is l ittle need for 
the insurance defense counsel to serve as the insured ' s  settlement 
advocate. 
Defendants with few or no assets to protect have little need for 
settlement representation and, thus, l ittle reason to pay extra to obtain it.9 1 
Indeed, it is the plaintiff, not the judgment proof (or near-judgment proof) 
defendant who bears the real settlement risk.92 For defendants without 
significant assets, the best protection against all aspects of the c laim risk is 
the plaintiff s  interest in constructing the case so that the company wil l  
settle a s  favorably a s  possible. 
The "unsophisticated" insured with personal assets to protect presents 
the most difficult case, because that insured may not easily appreciate the 
need to obtain independent advice about settlement. In my view, 
obligating the lawyer to make sure that that insured in fact comes to 
appreciate that need93 provides better protection than a rule that requires 
9 1 .  Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that most individual insureds feel  l i tt le need 
to pay extra for less settlement risk is the prevalence of low l imit insurance policies. 
92 .  See, e.g., Steele v .  Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 44 1 (7th Cir. 1 986)  (Posner, J . ) .  
93 .  Si lver and Syverud ground that obligation in professional responsibil ity law. See 
Silver & Syverud, supra note 5 at, 3 1 1 - 1 3  (grounding obligation to inform cl ient in  the duty 
of loyalty). I would also ground it in insurance law. See, e.g. , Myers v. Ambassador Ins. 
Co., 508 A.2d 684 ( Vt. 1 986) (ob l igating insurance company to advise insured of the 
existence of a conflict of interest so the insured can determine whether to retain personal 
counsel);  see also Steele v. The Hartford Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 44 1 (7th Cir. 1 986) ( i l l ustrating 
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the lawyer to act on the insured ' s  behalf against the lawyer' s  interests.
94 
Fulfilling that obligation is likely to require the lawyer to provide the 
insured much of the same information that a lawyer representing the 
insured for settlement purposes would provide, but with the additional 
disclosure that the lawyer is prohibited from undertaking that 
representation because of the conflict between the company and the 
lawyer. 
Moreover, all insureds benefit from the common practice of the 
company using the insurance defense lawyer to handle the settlement on 
behalf of the company. Under the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the 
company has the obligation to consider the interests of the insured in all 
aspects of the claim, including settlement. This obligation is  implemented 
not by an abstract entity, but rather by real people who have limited access 
to information and competing demands on their time. Of all the people 
available to handle settlement on behalf of the company, the insurance 
defense lawyer is the person most likely to know and understand the 
situation of the insured and, therefore, best able to take into account the 
insured's interests . If insurance or professional responsibil ity law were to 
obligate the insurance defense lawyer to represent the insured for purposes 
of settlement, the real people to whom companies will assign settlement 
responsibilities will be company counsels and adjusters. Neither company 
counsel nor an adjuster will know and understand the insured ' s  situation as 
well  as the insurance defense lawyer. Thus, the higher liab ility insurance 
premiums that would likely result from requiring the lawyer to represent 
the insured for purposes of settlement seem unlikely in practice to purchase 
additional protection for insureds. 
the extent of measures insurance defense lawyers are expected to undertake to ensure that 
individual insureds understand the nature of conflicts of interest). 
94. The "lawyer's  interests" I am referring to here are not simply the interest in  
obtaining more fees from avoiding a settlement, but  also the interest in obtain ing additional 
business from the company by favoring the company over the insured in the context of 
settlement. The clearest examples of cases in which the conflict between company and 
insured would make i t  difficult for the lawyer to be the insured 's  loyal settlement advocate 
are those in which the interests of the company and the p laintiff potentia l ly overlap: the 
Separation Assault, Food Poisoning, and Punitive Damages cases. Even in cases in which 
the interests of company and plaintiff do not overlap, however (the Low Limits, 
Misrepresentation, and Softbal l  cases), there are many scenarios in which resisting 
settlement would be in the company's  interest. 
\ 
1 I 
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C. Conflicts in the Judgement Risk Approach 
The judgment risk approach holds out the potential for preserving the 
triangular relationship between the lawyer, the insured and the company in 
its normal state. The judgment risk approach would do this, not by 
eliminating the conflict between the company and the insured, but rather 
by removing the lawyer from the middle of that conflict and thereby 
eliminating the lawyer ' s  choice between company and insured.  
In the Misrepresentation Case, and only in that case, the judgment risk 
approach realizes most of that goal . In the Misrepresentation Case, the 
conflict between the company and the insured relates only to the coverage 
for the claim and the related effect that uncertainty over coverage has on 
the company's  commitment to the defense and settlement of the c laim. By 
making clear that the scope of the lawyer' s  representation of the insured 
includes neither coverage nor settlement risk, the judgment risk approach 
takes the lawyer out of the middle of those two conflicts. 
The lawyer does remain in the middle of the conflict over the amount 
of effort to devote to the defense of the case, but the judgment risk 
approach contains that conflict by reducing the company' s  ability to shirk 
in the defense. The judgment risk approach charges the company�and by 
extension the lawyer�with the responsibility of defending the claim as if 
there were no coverage dispute .95 Opposing company efforts to shirk in 
the defense is in the lawyer' s  self-interest, and, because the lawyer' s  
participation i n  such shirking would b e  grounds for a malpractice claim, 
the judgment risk approach empowers the lawyer to resist company efforts 
to shirk. 
· 
In all the other pattern conflict cases, the judgment risk approach 
leaves the lawyer firmly embedded in the conflict between company and 
insured. In each of these other cases, the company has an opportunity to 
manage the defense lawyer' s  representation of the insured in a way that 
shifts claim risk to the insured.  In the Low Limits Case, the company can 
manage the defense so as to make it more difficult for the insured to later 
95 .  A court surely would imply in the retainer agreement between the company, lawyer 
and insured those requirements from the l iabi l ity insurance contract that benefit the insured. 
The company has actual notice of such requirements, the lawyer has constructive notice, 
and the insured has a reasonable expectation that a retainer agreement formed in  an effort to 
fulfi l l  the requirements of the l iabi l i ty insurance contract will not reduce the insured ' s  rights 
under that contract. 
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prove that the case could have been settled within the policy limits . In the 
Multiple Victim Case, the company can direct the lawyer to represent the 
insured only with respect to the first claim, pay that claim and terminate 
the representation. In the Separation Assault Case and the Softball Case, 
the company can use the defense to gather information helpful to the 
coverage case and, absent a shift in control ,  even to shape the outcome of 
the liability case to its benefit.96 In the Food Poisoning Case, the company 
can instruct the lawyer to handle the case in a manner that exacerbates the 
potential reputational harm, thus increasing the likelihood that the insured 
settles at its own expense to avoid that harm. And in the Punitive Damages 
Case, the company can instruct the lawyer to handle the case in a manner 
that exacerbates the risk of punitive damages. 
All this is review from Part II above. The significant point here is  that 
the judgment risk approach to the duty to defend does not eliminate the 
"lawyer' s  choice" in these other pattern cases. Thus, unless the law 
constrains that choice, it seems likely to be governed solely by the interests 
I explored using the metaphor of the liability insurance tetrahedron. 
Silver and Syverud unapologetically would constrain that choice in 
favor of obligating the lawyer to protect the company' s  interest in 
minimizing the judgment risk. Thus, in the Softball Case they would 
obligate the lawyer to inform the company of the information that may 
threaten the insured' s  coverage.97 And in the Food Poisoning Case they 
would obligate the lawyer to withdraw from the case once there is a 
concrete action that implicates the conflict, unless the insured agrees to 
sacrifice its reputational interest in favor of reducing the company' s  claim 
risk.98 By extension, they would require the lawyer to follow the 
company' s  instructions regarding the handling of the insured ' s  defense in 
the Low Limits, Multiple Victim, Separation Assault and Punitive 
96. For example, if  the p laintiff includes both a negligence and an intentional tort count 
in the complaint, the company could manage the defense in a way that made if more l ikely 
that the l iabi l ity case would result in an outcome that would be more helpful to the company 
in avoiding coverage. The company could do this by, for example, instructing the defense 
lawyer to request a special verdict form rather than a general verdict form. This could assist 
the company in avoid coverage because a special verdict form would ask the jury to 
consider the negligence and intentional tort counts separately. If the jury finds the 
defendent l iable under the intentional tort, the company may not have to pay the c laim 
(depending on the col lateral estoppel rules of the jurisdiction and the particular facts of the 
case). I f the jury answers a general verdict, there wi l l  be no finding of intent. 
97 .  See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 343-48 .  
98 .  See id. at 328 .  
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Damages cases, even when those instructions would further the company' s  
interests against the insured i n  a later failure to settle or coverage case.99 
This does not mean that Silver and Syverud would obligate the lawyer 
in fact to carry out such instructions. Under the norms of professional 
responsibility they describe, the lawyer would have a duty of loyalty to the 
insured that would require the lawyer to explain the existence of a conflict 
and to obey contrary instructions of the insured. In the face of such 
contrary instructions, the lawyer would not be obligated in fact to carry out 
either the instruction of the company or the instruction of the insured, but 
rather would be obligated to withdraw from the case. 1 00 If the insured 
continued to issue the same instructions to the replacement defense lawyer, 
that lawyer would also be required to withdraw, as would the next lawyer, 
and so on. The result would be that the insured would not receive a 
defense. 1 0 1 Thus, Silver and Syverud would allow the company to 
condition the provision of a defense on the insured agreeing to allow the 
defense lawyer to favor the company's  interests over the insured' s .  
Nevertheless, I d o  not read Silver and Syverud a s  saying that the 
company can "do no wrong" in the handling of these cases. Indeed, I have 
no doubt that they would condemn a company that crudely profited at the 
insured' s  expense. Their approach simply takes away from the lawyer the 
need to decide whether the lawyer is obligated to honor any particular 
instruction from the company and leaves the policing of the company's  
conduct to  a subsequent bad faith suit between the company and the 
insured. 
This approach has the great benefit of simplicity and predictability. It 
gives the defense lawyer a clear objective: reducing the judgment risk. It 
prohibits the lawyer from allying with either the insured or the plaintiff 
99. I should be c lear that they do not reach these issues and, thus, may disagree. It i s  
possible that they would conclude in the Separation Assault Case that, in juri sdictions where 
there i s  no shift in control ,  the conflict between the insured and the company i s  so acute 
that, as a matter of professional responsibility law, the lawyer may not represent both 
company and insured. Once the lawyer represents only the insured, the duty of loyalty upon 
which they base the lawyer's obligation to provide the information to the company would 
no longer apply. 
I OO. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 5 ,  at 359. 
I 0 I .  If the instruction relates to information (as in a Softball-type case), a particular 
conflict may be resolved in a contrary manner, because the new lawyer may not receive that 
information. For example, if the first defense lawyer withdraws in the Softball case, the 
second lawyer may not learn about the first lawyer's  conversations with the potential 
witnesses. 
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against the company. It reduces the likelihood that the insured wil l  place 
mistaken trust in the lawyer and the company. And, provided the lawyer 
fully discloses the limited scope of the representation, it encourages the 
insured to retain a separate lawyer whose loyalty wil l be unconflicted. 
While this approach may seem to disadvantage an insured without 
substantial assets, that insured wil l  receive at least some protection from 
the plaintiff, who has the greatest interest in structuring the case to 
maximize the company's  claim risk. 
D. Leavening the Judgement Risk Approach 
From an insurance law perspective, however, Si lver and Syverud' s  
approach (at least as I have understood and extended it) goes  too far in 
limiting the duty to defend. The core problem is that their approach 
obl igates the person most immediately in charge of the defense-the 
defense lawyer-to harm the insured, either by providing harmful 
information to the company or by defending the case in a manner intended 
to advantage the company over the insured in a subsequent or pending 
dispute. Granted, this wil l  only happen in a limited set of circumstances, 
and in some of those circumstance the insured may even "deserve" the 
harm. Indeed, in many cases the insured will either have chosen to buy an 
insurance policy with an absurdly low limit 1 02 or wil l  have committed a 
senous wrong. 
Nevertheless, insurance law requires insurance companies to give 
"equal consideration" to the interests of insureds in handling liability 
claims. 103 Thus, even though the source of the shared claim risk may be 
I 02. My current favorite examples are obstetricians and cardiac surgeons with 
$250,000 malpractice policies (a common practice in South Florida). I doubt many of these 
doctors have l iabi l i ty l imits this low in their automobile or homeowners' insurance pol ic ies. 
1 03 .  See, e.g., Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532, 537 ( l Oth Cir. 1 976) (explaining the 
equal consideration principle in the duty to settle context in which it originated). As the 
Coleman court recognized, the equal consideration principle applies when the company has 
control over decisions in which there is a confl i ct between company and insured. As that 
broad description of the principle suggests, i t  applies to the duty to defend as wel l .  See, 
e.g. , Bennett v. Conrady, 305 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1 957) ("[b]ecause of poss ible confl icts of 
interest between an insurance company and its insured in the defense or settlement of claims 
against the insured there is a mutual fiduc iary relationship whereby each owes the other the 
duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting such defense or settlement"). Indeed, the 
Washington Supreme Court has stated that the company's  duty goes beyond equal 
consideration when defending a case under a reservation of rights. See Tank v. Public 
Employees M ut. Ins.  Co., 7 1 5  P.2d 1 1 33 ,  1 1 37  (Wash. 1 986) ("the potentia l  conflict of 
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the insured ' s  negligence in purchasing insurance (the Low Limits and 
Multiple Victim cases), or a strong likelihood that the insured acted with 
sufficient culpability to satisfy either the intentional harm exclusion or the 
standard for punitive damages (the Separation Assault, Softball and 
Punitive Damages Cases), the company nevertheless may not manage the 
defense of the claim in a way that exploits the risk faced by the insured to 
reduce the risk faced by the company. 
Retaining a defense lawyer on terms that require the lawyer to betray 
the insured when the company so requests is unlikely to be seen as 
consistent with the equal consideration principle .  As I have explored 
elsewhere, betrayal is a potent theme in insurance law discourse that 
insureds have often used to constrain insurance company behavior. 1 04 The 
fact that, under norms of professional responsibility law, the lawyer may 
not be obligated in fact to carry out those instructions if the insured 
obj ects, 1 05 does not insulate the company from the insured's  complaint. It 
will remain the case that the insured will be required to choose between 
betrayal and a defense. 
That choice is hardly consistent with the insurance law vision of the 
insurance company as the insured ' s  protector. 1 06 Indeed, it takes very little 
imagination to see that the Silver and Syverud approach would transform 
the lawyer in the Softball case from the insured ' s  shield into the 
company' s  sword. That is how I see it, and, while I acknowledge that 
shields and swords, like triangles and tetrahedrons, are only metaphors and 
that there may be other ways of understanding that situation, I predict this 
is also how judges will see it. 
Thus, although I conclude with Silver and Syverud that a company can 
fulfill its duty to defend by retaining a lawyer to minimize the judgment 
risk associated with the claim (and therefore that a company has no 
interests between an insurer and insured inherent in this type of defense mandates an even 
higher standard"). 
I 04. See Baker, supra note I 0, at 1 3 95-96, 1 4 1 8-20, 1 423.  
I 05. See Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at  35 1 .  
I 06. See Baker, supra note I 0, at 1 403-07, 1 4 1 9-20. A recent print advertisement for a 
new form of directors and officers l iabi l i ty insurance portrays this vision in striking terms. 
The advertisement consists of a large photo of a pair of well worn business shoes, over the 
caption: "The First D&O Coverage With "Duty To Defend" For Public Companies. It Puts 
Carriers Where They Belong." Bus. INS . ,  Jan. 1 3 , 1 997, at 40; NAT ' L UNDERWRITER PROP . 
& CAS./RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED., May 1 9, 1 997, at 22 .  A company that hires a defense 
lawyer on terms that require the lawyer to betray the insured is hardly standing in the shoes 
of the insured. 
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obligation to retain a lawyer to represent the insured with respect to 
coverage, settlement or other non-judgment risk), I also conclude that the 
duty to defend requires the company to retain the lawyer to represent the 
insured first in a conflict situation. This "primary client" rule arises from 
the company' s  duty of good faith, as expressed by the equal consideration 
principle and by cases requiring the insurance company to give up control 
over the defense when the conflict between the company and the insured is  
severe. 
Because the duty to defend is implied (whether "in fact" or "in law") 
in the retainer agreement, the lawyer is so obligated whether the company 
explicitly instructs the lawyer or not. 1 07 For example, the lawyer should 
not provide information to the company that increases the uncertainty o f  
insurance coverage for the claim, the lawyer should not conduct the 
defense in a manner that unnecessarily harms the reputation of the 
insured, 1 08 and the lawyer should not refrain from providing his  or her best 
judgment about the value of the l iability case to the company and the 
insured. 
Like the duty to evaluate settlement possibilities as if there were no 
dollar limits in the insurance policy, and like the duty to defend as if  there 
were no doubts about coverage for the claim, the duty to retain the lawyer 
to represent the insured first in a conflict situation should provide real 
protection to insureds because that duty benefits other participants in the 
liability insurance relationship . The duty to represent the insured first in a 
conflict situation benefits the defense lawyer by reducing the likelihood of 
the lawyer being conflicted out of a case and by clarifying the lawyer' s  
obligations in a way that reduces the likelihood that the insured will feel  
betrayed by the lawyer. The duty also benefits the plaintiff by providing a 
I 07. Si lver & Syverud conclude that under established norms of  professional 
responsibi l ity the l iabi l ity insurance contract "bleeds into" the retainer agreement. See 
Si lver & Syverud, supra note 5, at 27 1 .  I agree, though I would l ike to register a small 
contracts teacher ' s  complaint. Contracts do not "bleed" into one another. I nstead, terms 
from one contract are, in the appropriate c ircumstance, implied (in fact or in law) into 
another because of a course of dealing, trade practice or other appropriate reason. 
I 08. I recognize the fai lure of analytical imagination that requires the use of the word 
"unnecessari ly" in this situation. The harm that this standard is seeking to prevent is that of 
the company exploiting the insured ' s  vulnerabi l ity in order to spend less money on a claim 
than it would if the insured did not have that vulnerabil i ty. The lawyer presented with an 
instruction from the company that has the potential to cause significant harm to the 
insured 's  reputation (or other non-judgment stake) is best served by drawing that potential 
to the attention of the insured, so that the insured wi l l  retain independent counsel to 
negotiate with the company over the direction of the defense. 
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potential avenue for relief in the event of a verdict in excess of the policy 
limits or outside the policy. In other words, the obligation to regard the 
insured as the primary client is an obligation lawyers likely will fulfill ,  
both because it  i s  in their long term interest to do so and because plaintiffs 
(more accurately, plaintiffs ' lawyers) are in a position to discover and act 
upon breaches of that obligation that result in harm to insureds. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the practical effect of my 
"primary client" approach would differ only slightly from that of the "non­
subordination" approach of Silver and Syverud. In a limited set of conflict 
situations, a primary client rule would require the lawyer to ignore an 
insurance company instruction, where a non-subordination rule would 
require the lawyer to ask the insured to waive the conflict and to withdraw 
if the insured refuses. Regardless which of us turns out to be "right" (in 
the sense of best predicting what courts will decide), the most significant 
service the defense lawyer provides an insured in conflict situations is one 
that we seem to agree about. That service consists of a direct statement 
that a conflict exists, a clear explanation of the decisions that the insured 
needs to make as a result of the conflict, and forceful advice that the 
insured retain a personal lawyer to assist in making those decisions. This 
advice matters most in connection with settlement, where personal counsel 
can advise the insured whether to limit the potential loss by first settling 
the case and then disputing coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding, I want to emphasize that this article reflects a positive, 
not a normative, analysis of the duty to defend.  I have described the 
liability insurance relationship and insurance law as I see them. As the 
liability insurance tetrahedron helps to demonstrate, there are tradeoffs in 
any definition of the scope of the duty to defend.  It is my judgment that 
the equal consideration principle of insurance law requires the company to 
provide the insured a space in the relationship with the insurance defense 
lawyer in which the insured ' s  interests are primary. But I am not prepared 
to claim that granting the insured that space will always make the world a 
better place. 
If we intend to ground tort law in deterrence-and much of the recent 
academic writing and many judicial opinions assert that is the case-then 
we should be concerned that insureds can and will use that space to 
cooperate tacitly with plaintiffs and induce companies to pay claims that, 
from a pure deterrence perspective, companies perhaps should not pay. 
My view, however, is that liabil ity insurance law is no more distinct from 
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tort law than "law" is distinct from "practice," and that this application of 
insurance law ' s  equal consideration principle is only one of many legal 
phenomena that demonstrate that tort law-in-action is not grounded 
primarily in deterrence. 
Indeed, working through the liability insurance tetrahedron provides 
further evidence that victim compensation is at least as important to tort 
law-in-action as deterrance. In each of the pattern cases that presented a 
real "plaintiff s  choice" (which is to say, all but the Misrepresentation 
Case), that choice turned in part on the ability-to-pay of the insured. When 
the insured has no assets, the liability insurance relationship presents the 
plaintiff with the opportunity to ally tacitly with the insured against the 
company and, in effect, to expand the insurance available for the c laim. 
But, where the insured has assets, the liability insurance relationship 
presents the plaintiff with the opportunity to ally tacitly with the company 
against the insured and, in effect, to narrow the insurance available for the 
c laim. 
Thus, in part because of liability insurance, tort law-in-action 
constitutes a sliding scale system of deterrence at least partially attuned to 
the defendant ' s  ability to pay. The greater the wealth of the defendant, the 
more tort law-in-action serves a deterrence function. The less the wealth 
of the defendant, the more deterrence gives way to compensation. I am 
reserving my normative judgment about that for a better understanding of 
the world than that provided by current tort and insurance theory. 
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APPENDIX 
CONSTRUCTING THE INSURANCE 
LIABILITY TETRAHEDRON 
1 .  Copy and enlarge the insurance liability tetrahedron below. 
2. Fold dotted lines and Flaps A. B & C down. 
3 .  Tape Flap A under the Settlement Triangle. 
4. Tape Flap B under the Jwy Triangle. 
5 .  Tape Flap C under Plaintiff's Choice Triangle. 
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